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A tale of two perspectives: 
old or new challenges for monetary policy? 
Claudio Borio, William English and Andrew Filardo 
Introduction
1 
Over the past decade much of the world has entered a phase of low and comparatively stable inflation. 
No doubt several factors have contributed to this development. Even so, it is generally agreed that 
central banks’ strong anti-inflation commitment and increased credibility have played a critical role. 
The turning point is typically identified with the late 1970s or early 1980s. It was then that, underpinned 
by the necessary political and intellectual consensus, monetary authorities intensified their efforts to 
bring inflation under control. 
This drawn-out battle has yielded great benefits. Low and stable inflation has laid the basis for better 
long-run economic performance. High and variable inflation had been a key factor inducing 
misallocation of resources. With economies less inflation-prone, central banks have not had to abort 
economic expansions prematurely in order to fight rapidly emerging inflationary pressures. And with 
economies seemingly less vulnerable to second-round price effects following unfavourable supply side 
shocks, central banks have been under less pressure to tighten aggressively to forestall inflationary 
developments, thereby avoiding the concomitant costs for economic activity. 
At the same time, the 1990s and the initial years of the new century have not been free of challenges 
for central banks. Paradoxically, one challenge has been learning to deal with potential supply side 
improvements and the uncertainty surrounding them. Financial and real side deregulation, both within 
and across national borders, and, more recently, the introduction of new IT technologies are obvious 
examples. A second, and perhaps not unrelated, challenge has been how to factor into the monetary 
policy framework more virulent boom and bust cycles in asset prices, typically occurring alongside 
similar fluctuations in credit. Financial and banking crises have sometimes accompanied such 
developments. In the wake of one such episode, Japan has experienced deflation and policymakers 
there have struggled to reflate the economy, with policy rates reaching the zero lower bound. 
More  recently, central banks have had to contend with an unexpected and in some cases sharp 
slowdown in economic activity - a slowdown that, in addition, appeared to be unusually synchronised 
across countries. Contrary to the prevailing experience in the postwar period, the slowdown was not 
triggered by a tightening of policy designed to quell rising inflationary pressures but by the unwinding 
of an investment boom, associated with a boom-and-bust movement in equity prices. 
This paper seeks to draw some possible lessons from this set of experiences with a view to identifying 
the challenges that central banks might face going forward. In order to highlight the genuine 
uncertainty that surrounds the lessons to be drawn, the paper examines recent experience through 
two alternative, intentionally polarised, lenses. While agreeing in several respects, the corresponding 
perspectives lead to somewhat different conclusions in terms of the balance of risks faced by central 
banks in the current environment and the appropriate policy responses. 
The first view, call it the “continuity” view, sees the current economic environment as a natural 
extension of that which prevailed during much of the previous inflationary period. Accordingly, the 
lessons drawn from that period apply with little, if any, modification to present conditions. The 
dynamics of the economic system have not significantly changed. The risks faced by central banks 
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and the set of strategic and tactical policy benchmarks developed during the fight against inflation are 
still reliable yardsticks. This view tends to regard some of the new challenges faced during the more 
recent period, and the corresponding unexpected economic developments, as essentially the result of 
unusual “shocks”. Accordingly, there is no particular reason to expect these shocks to recur. In other 
words, the economic environment has not fundamentally changed. 
The alternative view, call it the “new-environment” view, sees the new challenges faced as inherent in 
the current landscape, characterised by liberalised financial markets, low inflation - underpinned by 
apparently high credibility of central banks’ anti-inflation commitment - and uncertainty about the 
degree of structural supply side improvements. The challenges, that is, are in part the footprints of the 
gradual emergence of a new environment. A key characteristic of this new environment is that during 
unsustainable booms overt inflationary pressures may take longer to emerge. This can make it harder 
for monetary policy to be sufficiently pre-emptive. Monetary policy may thus unwittingly accommodate 
the build-up of financial imbalances and associated distortions in the real economy, notably excessive 
capital accumulation. Moreover, with inflation initially at a low level, the risk that the process may 
unwind in a disruptive manner could result in a subtle shift in the balance of risks, away from higher 
inflation and towards economic weakness and, possibly, even deflation. This view highlights the role of 
financial imbalances in the dynamics of the economy and suggests that central banks may need to 
respond in a more purposeful way to the imbalances as they build up. 
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section I lays out some key facts about the unfolding 
economic environment since the late 1980s. Section II reviews the challenges faced by central banks 
during this period. Section III lays out the continuity and new-environment views, briefly interpreting 
economic developments through these two perspectives. Section IV explores in more detail the 
implications of the two views for the way in which financial imbalances should be factored into policy, 
as this is perhaps the key feature distinguishing between the two perspectives. Section V draws some 
broader implications of the new-environment view for the policy framework. The Conclusion highlights 
the main points of the paper. 
Before plunging into the subject matter, it may be worth stressing a number of points regarding the 
precise objective, approach and scope of the paper. 
First, the objective of the paper is not to provide a thorough characterisation, assessment and 
empirical test of the two views. Rather, it is simply to show that recent experience could reasonably be 
viewed through two quite different perspectives, or indeed combinations thereof, and that the view 
taken can potentially have significant implications for monetary policy. By so doing, the paper hopes to 
encourage further analytical and empirical work on the issues raised by the comparison of the two 
paradigms. Indeed, we recognise that, at least for some aspects of the new-environment view, it may 
simply be too early to carry out rigorous statistical tests that could command a sufficient degree of 
confidence. Thus, the paper does not really provide new empirical evidence, but draws on existing 
work and organises facts in a way intended to highlight the perspectives under consideration. In the 
process, however, it also points to a number of informed hypotheses that could be researched further. 
Second, the polarisation of the two perspectives is simply a rhetorical device to highlight those aspects 
of the paradigms that deserve further attention and those convictions that may be taken too easily for 
granted. Focusing on the two ends of a spectrum can help us better understand and gain awareness 
of what we know and do not know. In practice, views within the academic and policy communities 
inevitably combine elements of the two perspectives to varying degrees. For much the same reasons, 
as shown by some recent policy statements, one could adopt some of the refinements to policy 
frameworks suggested by the new-environment view without accepting its most controversial 
elements. That view simply serves to add further support to the refinements. 
Finally, the new-environment view also has important implications for prudential policies and their 
relationship to monetary policy. After all, the risk of financial distress with macroeconomic 
consequences plays a prominent role in the story. Except tangentially, however, this paper discusses 
only monetary policy. Other work has already extensively examined the prudential dimension.
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I.  Changes in the macroeconomic environment 
Over the past two decades, the economic environment has been changing in fundamental ways. 
Inflation rates have generally fallen and subsequently inflation has remained low and more stable in 
much of the world. In many countries, the virulence of the business cycle has receded, with longer 
expansions and relatively brief and shallow recessions. However, at the same time asset price, credit 
and investment booms and busts have become a more important source of macroeconomic instability, 
in both developing and developed countries. In particular, financial crises with macroeconomic costs 
have become more frequent and severe. 
These changes have taken place alongside a number of structural shifts, underpinned by 
modifications in institutions. One prominent shift has been central banks’ stronger focus on price 
stability. A  second has been greater fiscal discipline and reforms aimed at improving the growth 
potential of the economy. A third, fundamental one has been financial market liberalisation and the 
related deepening of the globalisation of finance and economic activity more generally. 
Salient economic developments 
Lower and more stable inflation  
A striking feature of the economic environment over the last 20 years or so has been the dramatic 
change in the inflation picture. Since at least the early 1990s, much of the world appears to have 
entered a period of relatively low and more stable inflation. This has naturally gone hand in hand with 
a decline in nominal interest rates. 
The disinflation process has been a global phenomenon (Table I.1 and Graph I.1). Admittedly, some 
cross-country differences are apparent. In the industrialised countries, inflation rates have declined 




Inflation and deflation 
Annual rates, in percentages 
  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-01 
Large industrialised
1       
  Headline  7.8 3.3 3.5 1.9 2.2 
  Core  7.5 3.7 3.7 2.0 1.7 
 Wholesale  6.9  1.4 1.5 0.9 2.4 
 Services  5.8  3.9 4.6 2.4 2.6 
Other industrialised
2       
  Headline  8.5 6.0 3.8 1.5 3.0 
  Core  7.6 6.1 4.1 1.6 2.6 
 Wholesale  8.4  4.6 2.0 0.9 3.5 
 Services  8.8  7.2 3.9 2.2 3.5 
East Asian
3       
 Headline  10.9  4.7 6.8  11.1 4.4 
  Core      4.2  1.9 
 Wholesale  12.1  4.3 4.1  13.9 6.5 
  Services      4.7  8.3 
Latin American
4       
 Headline  95.5  303.5 1,180.5  31.2  7.0 
  Core   84.0 17.3 24.6  8.6 
 Wholesale  106.0  306.9 1,202.9  32.5  10.5 
  Services   92.1 23.5  9.9  4.8 
1    United States, euro area, Japan, United Kingdom and Canada.     
2    Australia, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland.     
3  Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea.   
4  Brazil and Mexico. 4  BIS Papers No 19
 
 
1  Prior to 1996, left-hand scale; in thousand per cent. 
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developing countries, the progress has been somewhat more difficult and uneven and has generally 
lagged that in the industrialised world. While some regions, such as Asia, have a history of 
comparatively low inflation, others, notably Latin America, had to contend with very high inflation rates 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, even more recently, bursts of inflation have not been entirely 
absent, typically in the wake of collapses in exchange rate regimes. But by the end of the period, 
inflation rates were generally quite low, rarely exceeding 10% even in developing economies, and the 
cross-country dispersion had fallen dramatically. 
In fact, the disinflation process has been so strong that a number of countries are actually 
experiencing declines in the overall price level. In Asia, prices have been declining for some time in 
Japan, China and Hong Kong. Inflation rates are barely positive in other parts of East Asia. Elsewhere 
in the industrial world, while the overall price level has been rising, it has not been uncommon for 





As a percentage of country-years 
 1960-69
  1970-79
  1980-89 1990-99  1999-2001 
Headline inflation  4.1
2 0.7
3 1.0  3.3  8.3 
Core inflation  0.0
4  0.0
5  0.3
6  4.4 10.4 




10  13.5 
Wholesale inflation  12.4
11 5.3
12  12.3
13 20.0  23.9 
Note: Simple average of the following countries: Australia, Canada, Brazil, euro area, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States. 
1  Defined as a percentage of negative changes in all annual changes of the price index.   
2  For the euro area, 1966-69; for 
Thailand and Korea, 1965-69; for Indonesia, 1968-69.   
3  For Brazil, 1975-79.   
4  Includes only Canada, Switzerland and the 
United States.   
5  For the euro area, 1976-79; for the United Kingdom, 1975-79; for Australia, 1976-79; for Norway, 1974-79; 
Sweden, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, Mexico and Brazil are not included.     
6    Thailand and Korea are not 
included.   
7    For Canada, 1962-69; for Norway 1969 only; for Japan, 1961-69; the rest of the countries are not 
included.   
8  Includes only Canada, Norway, Japan, Australia (for 1975-79) and Switzerland (for 1971-79).   
9  For the United 
States, 1983-89; for the United Kingdom, 1988-89; for Mexico, 1982-89; the euro area, Indonesia, Korea and Brazil are not 
included.   
10  For the euro area and Korea, 1991-99; for Indonesia, 1997-99; for Brazil, 1992-99.   
11  Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the euro area are not included; for Brazil, 1961-69.   
12  Malaysia and the euro area are not included; for Indonesia, 
1970-79.   
13  For Malaysia, 1984-89. 
 
Lower inflation has also meant more stable inflation in at least two respects. First, the volatility of the 
inflation rate has declined. This has confirmed the well known positive relationship between the level 
and variance (or standard deviation) of inflation. In addition, and more subtly, there is some evidence 
that inflation has become “stickier” or, in technical terms, changes in inflation have become less 
persistent. Specifically, the univariate dynamics of inflation in the United States, Europe and Japan 
appear to be very different before and after 1985 (Table I.3). Before that year, inflation appeared to 
have a unit root in all three regions, implying that an increase in inflation in a given year led to a 
permanent rise. This lack of mean reversion indicates that shocks to inflation tended to persist 
indefinitely over time. By contrast, the data suggest that inflation was mean reverting after 1985, with 
increases in inflation being reversed over subsequent quarters. It is as if the inflation rate had become 
better anchored than in the past (see below).
3 
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The decline in inflation has naturally gone hand in hand with a similar decline in interest rates. In many 
countries, both short- and long-term rates are rather close to, or even below, postwar lows. Indeed, in 
Japan, policy rates have been at the zero lower bound, except for a short period, since early 1999. 
 
Table I.3 
Changing univariate inflation dynamics 
  ADF test statistic
1    ADF test statistic
1 
United States    Japan   
1960:4 to 1970:4  –2.5  1960:4 to 1970:4  –4.5 
1971:1 to 1984:4  –2.0  1971:1 to 1984:4  –3.1 
1985:1 to 2001:4  –3.9  1985:1 to 2001:4  –3.8 
Germany   France   
1961:1 to 1970:4  –5.1  1963:4 to 1970:4  –3.5 
1971:1 to 1991:4  –2.5  1971:1 to 1984:4  –2.4 
1992:1 to 2001:4  –4.7  1985:1 to 2001:4  –4.3 
United Kingdom    Italy   
1960:4 to 1970:4  –5.9     
1971:1 to 1984:4  –2.7  1971:1 to 1984:4  –1.9 
1985:1 to 2001:4  –3.4  1985:1 to 2001:4  –3.2 
1993:1 to 2001:4  –4.3    
Canada   G7   
1960:4 to 1970:4  –3.4     
1971:1 to 1984:4  –2.1  1971:1 to 1984:4  –2.3 
1985:1 to 2001:4  –4.8  1985:1 to 2001:4  –2.4 
    1993:1 to 2000:4  –3.5 
1  The bold font indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% significance level. The critical value for the 
test is based on the distribution of the asymptotic augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic (MacKinnon (1991)); in these 
models the critical value is –3.5. (At the 10% level, the critical value for the test is roughly –3.2.) A constant, a time trend and 
one lag of the change in the inflation rate are included in each ADF regression, ∆πt = µA + γπt–1 + βt + α∆πt–1 + εt. 
 
Moderation of business cycles 
Lower and more stable inflation has so far gone hand in hand with lower output volatility in large parts 
of the world. There is evidence that, measured either by the size of output gaps or by the variability in 
growth rates, output fluctuations have tended to moderate since at least the mid-1980s in most 
industrialised countries, even in comparison with the 1960s.
4 Across many countries, the duration of 
business and growth cycles has lengthened somewhat. And the average depth and height of troughs 
and peaks respectively have been lower than in the past (Table I.4 and Graph I.2). This broad picture 
of comparative stability is confirmed by a look at aggregate (PPP-weighted) G7 GDP growth 
(Graph I.3). If the recent sharp global slowdown is excluded (see below), output growth has been 
considerably less volatile since the mid-1980s. 
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Table I.4 
Salient features of business cycles 
Average duration 
(months) 
Average height of 
GDP gap (%) 
Average depth of 
GDP gap (%) 
Standard 



















United States  16  21  2.98 1.74  –3.24  –1.38 2.02 1.25 
Euro area      2.30  2.00 –3.08 –1.44 1.61 1.02 
Japan 18  19  3.08  2.39  –2.13  –1.91 1.88 1.21 
United Kingdom  20  26  3.33 1.91  –2.41  –1.74 1.68 1.23 
Canada 14  22  2.50  2.08  –2.94  –1.67 1.33 1.57 
Australia 18  33  3.00  1.95  –3.58  –1.51 1.66 1.40 
Sweden 33  18  2.69  1.79  –2.47  –1.94 1.47 1.39 
Norway     3.81  3.75  –4.50  –2.94 1.85 1.63 
Switzerland 41  27  4.75  1.79 –4.18 –1.56 2.71 1.11 
Brazil       3.94    –3.86    2.75 
Mexico   18   4.05   –4.34    2.35 
Korea 12  19  5.88  4.33  –7.23  –4.12 3.31 2.46 
Note: The average duration of each country’s growth rate cycle is indicated. An alternative definition of the cycle is based on 
expansions and contractions. Because of the strong growth in nearly all these countries in the pre-1980 period, such 
cross-country comparisons are not meaningful. However, using the NBER business cycle dates for the United States, the 
average duration of business cycle expansions has more than doubled from 47 months in the pre-1983 period to 107 months 
afterwards. 
 
This moderation has been particularly apparent in the United States, which experienced the longest 
expansion on record in the 1990s, following another comparatively long upswing in the 1980s and a 
comparatively mild recession in 1990-91. So far, the most recent recession has also been rather 
shallow by historical standards.  
Not all countries, however, have shared this positive experience. In particular, output volatility appears 
to have been greater in several economies that have gone through serious episodes of widespread 
financial distress. In the industrial world, the most notable example has been Japan.
5 And the same 
has been true for several countries in East Asia. In all of these cases, the crises had been preceded 
by a long period of rapid and rather steady growth (Graph I.4), and hence comparatively low volatility. 
Greater prominence of financial booms and busts 
The negative experiences in these countries point to a more generalised feature of the economic 
environment since the mid-1980s: the greater size and amplitude of medium-term fluctuations in asset 
prices, often accompanied by rapid credit expansion.
6 
Given data availability, this phenomenon is best illustrated for industrial countries. Graph I.5 
summarises the evidence for a sample of countries for which data on commercial and residential 
property prices were available. The behaviour of asset prices is captured by an aggregate asset price 
index, which weighs property and equity prices by rough estimates of their shares in private sector  
                                                       
5  This is missed in Table I.4 because of the common date chosen for the break. See Dalsgaard et al (2002) and Blanchard 
and Simon (2001). 
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Note: t = time in quarters. 
1    The line for each country corresponds to the date of the respective crisis (Japan: second quarter 1992; Mexico: 
January  1995; Thailand: July 1997; Malaysia and Indonesia: August 1997; Korea: November 1997; Brazil: January 1999; 
Sweden: second quarter 1992; Norway: second quarter 1991). 
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wealth. Country differences aside, the pictures illustrate that since the 1970s two major cycles have 
taken place and a third is under way, in sympathy with real economic activity. They correspond to the 
early to mid-1970s, the mid-1980s to the early or mid-1990s, and the second half of the 1990s to the 
present. Japan did not take part in the latest upswing following the bust in asset prices at the turn of 
the 1990s and the subsequent “lost decade”. The data indicate that, if anything, the size and 
amplitude of the cycles is growing. A generally positive correlation between asset prices and credit 
expansion is also evident. 
Booms and busts in credit and asset prices have been a common factor underlying another key 
development in the changing economic environment: the increased frequency and severity of 
episodes of widespread financial distress.
7 The disorderly unwinding of financial imbalances has 
contributed to economic downturns or economic weakness in both industrialised and emerging market 
countries. Starting in the late 1980s, examples include the Nordic countries, Japan, some Latin 
American countries and East Asia.
8 The resulting costs to the real economy have been especially high 
when such banking crises have coincided with currency crises.
9 Moreover, even when actual failures 
of financial institutions have been limited or non-existent, in some cases the unwinding of the 
imbalances has contributed to strains on the financial system and the real economy. The experiences 
of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia in the early 1990s stand out in this respect. 
Background structural changes 
The rise of a focus on price stability and supporting reforms 
The lower and more stable inflation performance of recent years reflects, in part, a sea change in 
thinking at central banks. The high inflation of the 1970s led central banks to focus policy to a much 
greater degree on inflation performance over the medium term.
10 Over time, this focus was 
underpinned by changes in the operational and institutional framework. 
Operationally, initially among countries with a history of comparatively high inflation, the authorities 
gradually adopted structured inflation targeting regimes, including specific numerical objectives for 
inflation. Starting with countries such as New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden, the 
trend subsequently extended much more widely, including several emerging market economies.
11 
Among these, the adoption of the new framework not infrequently took place in the aftermath of the 
collapse of regimes characterised by tighter exchange rate commitments.
12 The experiences of Brazil 
and several East Asian countries following financial crises are obvious examples. 
Institutionally, the stronger intellectual, political and social consensus to fight inflation crystallised in the 
trend towards endowing central banks with a greater degree of autonomy or “independence” to pursue 
mandates more clearly focused on price stability. The aim was to make central banks less vulnerable 
to possible external pressures to test the limits of monetary policy in pursuit of transient employment or 
                                                       
7  The incidence and severity of banking crises is documented in a historical perspective in Bordo et al (2001). 
8  See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for a more systematic approach documenting the pattern of financial imbalances leading 
to currency and banking crises in 20 countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America since 1980. Note that there is still some 
controversy over whether these crises, most notably those in East Asia, reflected primarily a deterioration in fundamentals 
(eg Corsetti et al (1999)) or were predominantly driven by self-fulfilling creditor runs (eg Radelet and Sachs (1998)). These 
issues are discussed in more detail in eg Corsetti (1998) and Borio (2003). The alternative hypotheses would have 
implications for predictability, an issue discussed below. 
9  For the costs of financial crises in terms of output forgone, see eg Hoggarth and Saporta (2001). 
10  For a broad-sweep cross-country examination of the evolution of monetary policy in the postwar period, see BIS (1997) and 
Cottarelli and Giannini (1997). For a discussion of the reasons for the failure of policy to control inflation in the United States, 
see Orphanides (2000), De Long (2000) and Romer and Romer (2002). 
11  See, for instance, Bernanke et al (1999a) and Schaechter et al (2000). Bernanke et al (1999a) also provide evidence that 
these explicit inflation targets have been followed by sustained disinflations in a number of cases. While inflation targets do 
not appear to have reduced the costs of such disinflations, they may help to bolster low inflation expectations once the 
disinflation has been achieved. 
12  See Ho and McCauley (2003) for a discussion of the shift to inflation targeting in emerging market countries, with particular 
attention paid to the role played by the exchange rate in such frameworks. BIS Papers No 19  13
 
output gains. The shift was also based on the fact that political pressures found fertile ground in a 
context where the short-run costs of a policy tightening were all too obvious but the long-term gains 
less apparent.
13 The intellectual basis for the shift was the recognition, reinforced in the high-inflation 
period, of the absence of a long-run trade off between inflation and unemployment.
14 
The strengthened focus on price stability by central banks was subsequently supported by broader 
changes in government policy. These changes, consistent with the same philosophy underlying the 
shift in central bank thinking, included, in particular, a trend towards greater fiscal discipline and efforts 
to improve the supply side of the economy, notably the functioning of labour markets. 
The shift towards a medium-term and less ambitious orientation in fiscal policy was in part the 
offspring of disillusionment with the perceived effects of activism and growing fiscal deficits on 
economic growth and inflation. It was reflected in a generalised trend towards tighter fiscal positions, 
most clearly apparent during the 1990s, sometimes supported by binding rules (Graph I.6). In Europe, 
for instance, fiscal constraints were seen as instrumental in the establishment of economic and 
monetary union (EMU) and, subsequently, in its smooth running, as reflected in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. More generally, fiscal discipline arguably helped to buttress the central banks’ efforts to 
ensure price stability, by providing a greater degree of operational freedom in, and lowering the 
political costs of, pursuing their primary objective.
15 And prohibitions on central bank lending to the 
government became a common feature of institutional frameworks securing central bank 
independence. 
During the 1990s in particular, governments redoubled efforts to improve the supply side of the 
economy. Goods markets and, above all, labour markets were the preferred targets. Privatisation and 
labour market reforms that aimed at increasing labour market flexibility were the primary tools. These 
efforts were intended to raise the long-run potential growth of the economy and promote employment 
growth. They were seen as supporting price stability not only through the higher long-term growth 
potential but also by reducing the likelihood of untoward shocks in wages and prices. Such supply side 
efforts were regarded as especially important in economies where structural rigidities were viewed as 
most severe, notably in Europe and emerging market countries. Many emerging markets embarked on 
major reform efforts, with the added incentive of attracting badly needed foreign capital. 
Financial liberalisation and globalisation 
Over a somewhat longer period, there has been a widespread move towards financial liberalisation, 
both within and across national borders. The G7 countries typically began partial liberalisations in the 
mid-1970s, and then pushed such reforms considerably further in the 1980s and 1990s. By the early 
1990s, their liberalisation efforts were virtually complete. Developing countries generally followed 
somewhat later, but made substantial progress in freeing their relatively repressed financial systems in 
the 1990s.
16 
                                                       
13  A literature has developed showing, empirically and analytically, a link between central bank independence and inflation 
performance; see Cukierman (1992) and Berger et al (2001) for surveys. In fact, work on the inflationary bias of monetary 
policy under “discretion”, starting with Barro and Gordon (1983), can also probably best be seen in this light. It may be more 
reasonable to view the bias as reflecting political pressure in the absence of clear mandates than as a deliberate attempt by 
the central bank to pursue overly ambitious employment or output objectives. 
14  This view was initially articulated by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968). It became much better accepted after the high-
inflation period that followed (Friedman (1977)). 
15  In the theoretical economic literature, the link between fiscal policy and inflation has a long tradition. It was put most starkly 
by Sargent and Wallace (1981), and has recently been revisited by the so-called fiscal theory of the price level 
(eg  Woodford (2001)). Operationally, recognition of the importance of fiscal discipline for de facto central bank 
independence has an equally long history (eg Toniolo (1988)). Especially in the 1990s, the concept of “fiscal dominance”, 
used to denote a situation in which monetary policy could not effectively operate in the presence of large fiscal deficits, was 
extensively used as background to policy prescriptions in emerging market countries. 
16  The process of financial liberalisation in industrial countries is overviewed concisely in BIS (1992) and, in much more detail, 
in OECD (1994). Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), inter alia, document an uneven, but ultimately substantial, trend towards 
deregulation of financial institutions and markets in developing countries as well. At the global level, Padoa-Schioppa and 
Saccomanni (1994) describe and analyse this shift, from what they call a government-led to a market-led international 
financial system.  14  BIS Papers No 19
 
Graph I.6 
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1  Weighted average, based on 1995 GDP and PPP exchange rates, of the United States, the euro area, Japan, the United 
Kingdom (from 1987), Canada, Australia, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Brazil, Korea and Mexico. For Brazil, Korea and 
Mexico, government budget balance as a percentage of nominal GDP; for Switzerland, central government budget balance as a 
percentage of nominal GDP. 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; OECD Economic Outlook. 
The recognition of the economic costs of financial repression, and the ascendancy of a free-market 
philosophy, were powerful forces behind liberalisation. In addition, the link between financial 
liberalisation and the inflation focus was not purely coincidental. Over time the shift towards a 
market-led system was hastened by the consequences of inflationary tensions. These gave a 
significant spur to financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage. Likewise, market discipline helped to 
reinforce the focus on inflation. By being unforgiving of lax government policies, market forces 
underpinned the shift towards greater fiscal and monetary prudence. 
In the wake of financial liberalisation and innovation, financial markets have become more integrated 
globally, especially after the temporary setback associated with the international debt crisis of the early 
1980s (Graph I.7). The greater financial market integration fostered an acceleration of cross-border 
financial flows of both portfolio and direct investment.
17 In the 1990s, international capital flows rose to 
unprecedented heights. Admittedly, the Asian crisis, and more recent difficulties in Latin America and 
elsewhere as global growth has slowed, have trimmed global flows of late, but the stock of outstanding 
international investment remains very large by comparison with that of 20 or 30 years ago.
18 
The liberalisation and globalisation of finance followed, and in several respects strengthened, the 
greater integration of goods markets across the globe. While the process had started much earlier, it 
was taken considerably further during the 1990s, supported by national and multilateral policy 
initiatives and reinforced by the surge in foreign direct investment. The process was also supported by 
technological advances, which favoured a tendency towards the “atomisation” of economic processes 
into smaller and smaller components. Hence the growing prominence of so-called supply chains in 




                                                       
17  In particular, foreign direct investment became a much more important source of capital flows to emerging markets in the 
late 1990s. For a discussion, see Mussa (2000a). 
18  Another effect of liberalisation and globalisation has been the growing importance of cross-border joint ventures and, 
especially in emerging market countries, mergers and acquisitions of financial organisations (Group of Ten (2001) and 
Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001)). 
19  Feenstra (1998) has a useful discussion of trade and the unbundling of the production process. BIS Papers No 19  15
 
 
1  Total gross capital flows relative to net capital flows, left-hand side.   
2  Right-hand side, in billions of US dollars, deflated by 
the US GDP deflator. 
Sources: IMF; World Bank. 
A return to the past? 
As a result of these structural changes in the economic environment, notably in financial markets and 
monetary institutions, the configuration of global economic arrangements has come to resemble in 
some significant respects that prevailing in the pre-World War I period. This was the last time that 
liberalised financial markets coincided with a monetary regime seen as guaranteeing monetary 
stability. In the early decades of the 20th century, this was the gold standard; nowadays, it is a 
monetary framework that, while based on fiat money, is structured so as to secure the control of 
inflation.
20 
In fact, in some respects the resemblance may be closer with the first phase of the interwar period. 
This phase had either seen successful efforts to re-establish monetary stability by returning to the gold 
standard, as in a number of central European economies, or experimentation in how to conduct 
monetary policy in a context of price stability but weakened exogenous constraints on credit 
expansion.
21 In particular, this was the situation in the United States in the 1920s, given the 
abundance of its gold reserves.
22 
                                                       
20  For an elaboration on this point, see Crockett (2000a), Borio and Crockett (2000) and Borio and Lowe (2002a), who also 
consider obvious differences. For a detailed comparison of the degree of financial liberalisation and integration, see, for 
example, Bordo et al (1999), Eichengreen (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (1998). These contributions also discuss 
monetary arrangements. 
21  For a discussion of this period, see, in particular, James (2001). 
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II.  Challenges for monetary policy 
Despite the low level of inflation and the generally less virulent output fluctuations experienced over 
the past decade or so in many countries, central banks have faced considerable challenges. These 
challenges have included possible changes in the behaviour of inflation and inflation indicators, 
increased uncertainty in some economies about the pace of underlying productivity growth, and 
difficulties caused by large asset price booms and busts and the financial crises that ensued in some 
cases. The nature of the recent economic slowdown, and the relatively weak and uneven recovery, 
also pose questions for monetary authorities. 
Changes in the inflation process 
One challenge facing central banks over the past decade, albeit one that reflects good news, is that 
inflation rates have generally fallen by more than would have been expected given the observed path 
of output and other inflation indicators. Real-time forecasts of inflation for a number of industrialised 
economies were consistently too high in the second half of the 1990s. The reasons for this 
development have been amply debated, although no clear conclusions have as yet emerged.
23 
A common set of interpretations has stressed changes in businesses’ pricing practices. These 
explanations draw strength from the observation that forecasts of wage inflation were closer to the 
mark than those for price inflation. They are also consistent with clear evidence that the pass-through 
from exchange rates to prices generally declined in the second half of the 1990s.
24 While it is difficult 
to assess the importance of different factors, and their relative significance has probably varied across 
countries, a number of possibilities have been suggested. 
The first possibility includes factors that could put downward pressure on firms’ pricing power, inducing 
them to settle for smaller markups of prices over marginal costs. The demand curve for products may 
have become more elastic, either as a result of greater price transparency (eg the increased use of the 
internet and reduced information costs more generally) or of increased competition in goods markets, 
not least as a result of deregulation and globalisation.
25 In addition, the fact that production now 
straddles national borders much more than in the past would tend to make prices less sensitive to 
purely domestic costs. 
A second possibility includes supply side developments that may have reduced firms’ marginal costs, 
thereby leading them to trim prices.
26 A likely candidate in some countries, most notably the United 
States, is that more robust underlying productivity growth, reflecting both hefty investment and faster 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth, may have allowed firms to limit price increases for a given rise in 
wages while still boosting margins and profits. So long as the faster productivity growth took time to 
flow through to wage setting behaviour, as seems to have been the case, this would put temporary 
downward pressure on prices for a given level of unemployment (ie reduce the level of the NAIRU).
27 
Another possible source of downward price pressure could be labour market reforms. For instance, 
efforts in some European countries to improve the matching of workers and firms or to reduce the 
attractiveness of unemployment compensation would be expected to lead to lower inflation for a given 
level of unemployment.
28 
                                                       
23  See, for example, Andersen and Wascher (2001), references therein and the other papers in BIS (2001a) and BIS (2001b). 
24  See Andersen and Wascher (2001) and BIS (2001a). For evidence of a general decline in exchange rate pass-through in 
industrial countries, see also Gagnon and Ihrig (2001). For Mexico, Baqueiro et al in this volume find that the level of 
exchange rate pass-through has fallen with the decline in the average rate of inflation, while Minella et al in this volume find 
less convincing evidence for Brazil and emphasise the importance of administered prices in measuring pass-through. 
25  In this volume, Amano and Hendry emphasise the role of market share considerations to help to understand the inertial 
behaviour of inflation. 
26  This possibility is consistent with the findings of Amato and Gerlach (2000), who argue that, conditional on unit labour costs, 
there is no compelling evidence that the inflation process has changed in a number of leading industrial countries. 
27  See Braun (1984) and Ball and Moffitt (2001). 
28  Lower oil prices may also have contributed to the lower than expected inflation performance in the late 1990s, but on 
balance oil prices have risen over the last 15 years. BIS Papers No 19  17
 
A final possibility focuses more on the dynamics of expectations and price setting at low levels of 
inflation. In particular, with expectations better anchored around low and stable inflation levels, 
possibly underpinned by stronger central bank anti-inflation credentials,
29 one-off unexpected 
increases in costs are less likely to feed through into prices, as they are less likely to be considered 
permanent.
30 For example, an increase in wages, if not accommodated by the authorities, would tend 
to be unwound in future through lower employment levels. Likewise, with smaller inflation differentials, 
changes in exchange rates might be expected to have less of a predictable drift, thereby slowing down 
the pass-through.
31 The presence of “menu” costs can generally contribute to this stickiness in 
prices.
32 
While the lower than expected inflation of recent years is surely good news, the fact that models of 
inflation performed relatively poorly suggests that our understanding of the inflation process is not as 
good as might have been thought. This realisation raises risks for central banks. On the one hand, 
given that policy takes time to have its effects on the economy, central banks would wish to act 
pre-emptively to combat expected pressures on prices or output. On the other hand, pre-emptive 
action is only possible if the central bank is confident of its ability to forecast such pressures. Thus, the 
difficulties in forecasting inflation in recent years have arguably made it more difficult to take 
pre-emptive actions. Other things equal, this suggests that central banks may have to wait longer 
before being confident enough to take action. 
Uncertainty about productivity growth 
A second challenge facing policymakers has been coming to grips with the uncertainty surrounding 
potential increases in productivity growth. By its very nature, reaching firm judgments about the 
sustainable pace of productivity growth is extremely difficult. Disentangling the sources of an increase 
- potentially including capital deepening, shifts in the sectoral distribution of output, cyclical effects on 
labour and capital utilisation, and faster TFP growth - is very hard. Importantly, judgments depend 
crucially on the sustainability of the capital deepening process. And experience suggests that it is the 
resilience of the pace of productivity growth during a recession that is critical in assessing long-run 
tendencies. These difficulties in reaching a firm judgment raise delicate issues for central banks, not 
least the risk of failing to be sufficiently pre-emptive. 
Most recently, the difficulties in forming a solid view have been evident in the United States, where the 
underlying pace of productivity growth stepped up over the second half of the 1990s. It was not until 
the end of the decade that a consensus emerged on the extent and likely sources of the acceleration, 
and considerable disagreement remains on the likely sustainability of the pickup.
33 As the 
US economy has slowed, productivity has continued to post robust, if somewhat downward-revised, 
gains, suggesting that the faster pace of advance in the late 1990s was not simply the result of the 
                                                       
29  The view that greater credibility of the central bank anti-inflation commitment, backed by changes in the operational 
framework, may have helped to better anchor expectations is rather common. This is found in central bank statements 
(eg Vickers (1999a), Dodge (2003)) and also academic work (eg Bernanke et al (1999a) and Cukierman (2002)). See also 
Johnson (2002) and Neumann and von Hagen (2002) for a comparison of inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting 
regimes in this respect. 
30  Taylor (2000), for instance, discusses how perceived lower persistence of cost changes implies a lower pass-through. 
31  By contrast, Campa and Goldberg (2002) attribute the smaller pass-through to changes in the composition of trade. 
32  See the seminal article by Mankiw (1985) and, in this volume, Aucremanne et al (2003) and Assarsson (2003). Calpin and 
Spulber (1987), however, note that menu costs at the level of individual prices need not result in sticky adjustments in the 
overall price index. 
33  For example, Jorgenson (2001), Gordon (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2002) all suggest an acceleration in productivity 
growth of nearly a percentage point, reflecting both faster TFP growth and capital deepening. All three also suggest that 
production of, and investment in, IT products can account for much of this pickup. However, while the projections presented 
by Oliner and Sichel suggest that faster underlying productivity growth is likely to be sustained, Gordon argues that 
decreasing returns to scale in the use of computing power are likely to limit productivity rises going forward. For an 
international perspective on productivity growth, see Scarpetta et al (2000). The time series evidence of a structural 
productivity break was suggestive but not statistically significant until the late 1990s; see Filardo (1995), Filardo and Cooper 
(1996) and Kahn and Rich (2003). 18  BIS Papers No 19
 
high-tech boom. At the same time, a larger proportion of the gains has recently been attributed to 
capital deepening rather than total factor productivity growth.
34 
Similar uncertainties in judging developments have been encountered elsewhere. The acceleration in 
productivity in the United States held the promise of faster productivity growth abroad as well, as 
technological advances in the United States diffused to, or signalled developments, elsewhere. 
However, the record in other countries has been mixed thus far, with little evidence that the new 
economy forces have been reflected in faster productivity growth outside North America (Graph II.1).
35 
For example, while Mexico and Canada appear to have shared somewhat in the acceleration in the 
United States, the euro area saw its productivity trend flatten.
36 In Australia, productivity growth had 
already picked up in the early 1990s, while in neighbouring New Zealand growth has, if anything, 
slowed. Brazil has seen an increase, but this growth may reflect more of a catching-up after economic 
crises there in the late 1980s. 
Such assessments about underlying productivity growth were, and still are, complicated by statistical 
and country-specific developments. In Europe, for example, differences in statistical methodologies 
and structural policies designed to boost employment may have masked underlying improvements.
37 
In addition, the experience of many economies suffering severe recessions after prolonged 
investment-driven booms suggests that judgments about long-term growth rates may not be robust. In 
these cases, initially higher estimates during the boom were revised downwards significantly after the 
crises. The experience of Japan and a number of East Asian countries, including Korea, illustrate this. 
For example, between April 1997 and April 2001, the consensus long-term (10-year) growth forecast 
for four East Asian countries experiencing financial crises in 1997 (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand) was reduced from just over 7% to 5.5%, reflecting a slowdown in productivity growth 
(Graph II.2).
38 More fundamentally, these observations suggest that a clear-cut distinction between an 
exogenous trend and cyclical movements may be misleading. 
Uncertainty about the underlying pace of productivity growth makes it more difficult for policymakers to 
evaluate the appropriate stance of monetary policy for at least two reasons. First, it complicates the 
assessment of actual and prospective slack in the economy, as might be gauged from real side 
variables, such as output gaps.
39 Moreover, errors in the assessment may throw policy off kilter. For 
instance, as a result of reduced confidence in the estimates, central banks may tend to put more 
weight on actual inflation developments, with the risk of failing to be sufficiently pre-emptive.
40 Second, 
even if the change in trend productivity growth is known, the implications for monetary policy will 
depend in large part on the extent to which the change is permanent or temporary and is understood 
by economic agents. Faster productivity growth in the long run would presumably have to be matched 
by higher real interest rates at some point. However, in the near term, the appropriate change is 
unclear. For instance, if workers and firms do not immediately take account of the faster productivity 
growth when setting wages, there may be less pressure on prices at any given level of   
 
                                                       
34  In an unpublished update to Oliner and Sichel (2002), the authors trim their estimate of the increase in labour productivity 
growth after 1995 from 0.89% to 0.71%, reflecting revisions in underlying data. Virtually all of this reduction reflects their 
lower estimate of the contribution of TFP growth to the acceleration in productivity, which was cut from 0.41% to 0.25%. 
35  The cross-country record is reviewed in more detail in Scarpetta et al (2000) and Gust and Marquez (2000). 
36  Of course, in Europe the major structural changes with possible implications for monetary policy, not only through their 
impact on productive potential, were German reunification at the beginning of the decade and the establishment of monetary 
union towards the end of it. But as productivity appeared to accelerate in the United States, searching questions were also 
raised in Europe. 
37  On statistical methodologies, see, eg Deutsche Bundesbank (2000) and Scarpetta et al (2000). 
38  On Japan, see Yamaguchi (1999a). 
39  These problems would come in addition to traditional ones, such as those arising from data revisions (Orphanides (2001)). 
See ECB (2000) for a discussion of the difficulties in assessing economic slack. A number of papers presented at the 
central bank economists’ meeting, some of which are included in this volume, touch on this question. Gruen et al (2002) and 
Gali et al (2002) provide recent results in the estimation of output gaps. In this volume, Lippi discusses the implications of 
uncertainty about output gaps for monetary policy. Olsen et al suggest that simple rules may help avoid policy errors related 
to uncertainty about the output gap. And Cette and Pfister discuss the implications of innovations in information and 
communication technologies for the appropriate monetary policy horizon. 
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Graph II.2 
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Note: t = time in quarters. 
1  Defined as GDP/employment.   
2  The line for each country corresponds to the date of the respective crisis (Japan: second 
quarter 1992; Mexico: January 1995; Thailand: July 1997; Malaysia and Indonesia: August 1997; Korea: fourth quarter 1997; 
Brazil: January 1999). 
Source: National data. 
employment, allowing the central bank to tighten policy less than would otherwise be the case. By 
contrast, quick recognition of the change, and hence perceptions of higher lifetime income and future 
profitability, could have such an expansionary impact on demand as to call for a sharper tightening in 
the short run than in the long run. This would be needed to keep aggregate demand in line with 
aggregate supply.
41 
Addressing financial booms and busts 
A third challenge faced by several central banks has been to come to grips with the increased 
frequency and severity of financial booms and busts, many of which have led to widespread financial 
dislocations. Specifically, central banks have had to consider how monetary policy can best respond to 
the build-up and unwinding of such imbalances. 
Arguably, the more natural first line of defence against financial imbalances is prudential regulation 
and supervision, an instrument that is likely to be less blunt than monetary policy. For example, if 
during the upswing of a boom there appears to be excessive lending to a particular sector, perhaps to 
fund outsized investment spending, then the lenders may well be taking on considerable credit risk. In 
such a case, supervisors could, perhaps through the review process, induce the lenders to limit their 
exposures, thereby limiting the extent of the imbalances. Even so, if excessive optimism and biases in 
risk assessment are widespread, supervisors may find it difficult to establish with sufficient clarity that 
the lending is inappropriate. In addition, in some cases, as with stock price misalignments, there is no 
obvious supervisory authority that can intervene. More generally, at present the use of prudential 
                                                       
41  See Viñals (2000) for a useful discussion of the possible implications of supply shocks for monetary policy. BIS Papers No 19  21
 
instruments to address what may be perceived as financial imbalances with an essentially 
macroeconomic origin remains problematic.
42 
The challenges faced by central banks in recent years have depended in part on the monetary regime 
in place. The room for manoeuvre was especially limited for central banks pursuing relatively tight 
exchange rate objectives. In such cases, faced with sizeable capital inflows, there was relatively little 
that monetary authorities could do, short of abandoning the objectives or reversing capital account 
liberalisation processes. This dilemma, for instance, was especially acute for emerging market 
countries, notably in East Asia. For those central banks with greater freedom with the interest rate 
lever, the problems were somewhat different. These related to difficulties in identifying the imbalances 
and in deciding on the extent to which it was appropriate to respond to them by tightening policy. 
Given the uncertainties involved, policymakers generally appeared to respond to the growing 
imbalances fairly gradually, as illustrated by experience in Japan and the United States.
43 Even here, 
however, external influences could act as a significant constraint. In the case of Japan in the second 
half of the 1980s, for instance, interest rates were arguably kept lower than would otherwise have 
been the case in order to prevent an unwelcome appreciation of the yen. This, in turn, may have 
contributed to the build-up of the imbalances.
44 
Once financial imbalances begin to unwind, policy should probably be eased to cushion the effects of 
that unwinding on the real economy, but questions remain about the appropriate pace of the easing, 
its intensity and effectiveness. In some cases, as in the United States and United Kingdom in the early 
1990s, financial “headwinds” caused by problems at deposit-taking institutions and/or private sector 
balance sheets led to a somewhat greater easing than would normally have been expected given the 
levels of output and inflation. Similarly, the Federal Reserve eased rates considerably in the first half of 
2001, following the collapse of equity prices in the technology sector, in order to offset the resulting 
negative wealth effects and the impact on investment of capital overhangs in some parts of the 
economy. More dramatically, the Bank of Japan ultimately cut its policy rate essentially to zero in 
response to the economic and banking sector problems that followed the bust in equity and property 
prices and the emergence of widespread financial distress. 
The current economic situation 
Policymakers face considerable challenges at the current juncture. These reflect a number of 
developments, some of which have taken central banks by surprise. 
The first development has been unexpected weakness in the global economy, starting with the abrupt 
slowdown in the United States in the autumn of 2001. Admittedly, it is not unusual for recessions to 
take authorities by surprise. But by postwar standards the current slowdown has been atypical in 
several respects. Most notably, the slowdown was not triggered by a tightening of monetary policy 
designed to quell inflationary pressures. In fact, inflation remained uncharacteristically quiescent. 
Rather, the upswing appeared to be brought to an end by a spontaneous unwinding of an investment 
boom, partly in the wake of what, in retrospect at least, turned out to be a remarkably sharp medium-
term swing in equity prices. Although the recession in the United States has been comparatively mild 
thus far, the global slowdown has been rather strong by past standards. If output is measured in PPP 
terms, the slowdown among the G7 ranks close to those associated with the oil price shocks of the 
1970s (Graph I.3, in previous section). The marked deceleration has resulted from the unusual 
synchronisation of the downturn across countries. While the slowdown in Japan and emerging market 
countries, dependent on exports to the United States, was to be expected, the intensity of the one in 
Europe came largely as a surprise. The global economy has continued to be weaker than expected, 
and forecasts of when growth in the largest economies will return to estimates of potential have been 
pushed back. 
                                                       
42  These issues are discussed in detail in Borio et al (2001), BIS (2001c), Lowe (2002), Segoviano and Lowe (2002) and, in 
particular, Borio (2003). 
43  For a discussion of the policy response in Japan see eg Yamaguchi (1999a), Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Cecchetti et al 
(2000), Okina et al (2001), Okina and Shiratsuka (2001) and Ahearne et al (2002); for a comparison of the United States 
and Japan, see BIS (2002a). 
44  This point is stressed in eg Bernard and Bisignano (2002). See also Yamaguchi (1999a). 22  BIS Papers No 19
 
The second development has been the unusual behaviour of key components of aggregate demand 
against the background of a rather uncharacteristic configuration of levels of indebtedness and asset 
prices. In particular, while investment spending has plummeted, household expenditure has held up 
remarkably well by past standards (Graph II.3). Household spending on consumption and housing has 
been sustained by the prompt easing of monetary policies and a continued rise in residential property 
prices.
45 In the light of the historically high levels of household indebtedness and comparatively high 
residential property prices in several countries (Graphs II.4 and II.5), questions have been raised 
about the sustainability of the recovery and the effectiveness of monetary policy when faced with such 
an unbalanced composition of spending. 
Finally, generally subdued inflation rates, with prices actually falling in some sectors, and low interest 
rates have raised the prospect of the zero lower bound constraint becoming more of a consideration in 
the setting of policy. The synchronised weakness in the global economy has complicated matters 
further. Under these conditions, there is less scope for monetary policy to stimulate growth through the 
exchange rate channel, since the instrument is less effective at the global level. The reason is that a 
lower exchange rate for one country means a higher one for another, only reallocating demand rather 
than increasing it, unless it induces expansionary policies in those countries experiencing the 
appreciation. 
Graph II.3 
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Note: t = time in quarters. 
1  Value of series 12 quarters prior to the trough date is rebased to 100.   
2  Using third quarter 1982 and fourth quarter 1974 as 
the trough dates. 
Source: National data. 
                                                       
45  These issues are discussed in more detail in BIS (2002b) and, more recently, in Sutton (2002), Deep and Domanski (2002), 
Canner et al (2002) and Zhu (2002). BIS Papers No 19  23
 
Graph II.4 
Residential property prices and stock market indices 
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1  Weighted average, based on 1995 GDP and PPP exchange rates.   
2  Using data from Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.   
3  For Japan, residential land prices. 

























III. Two  alternative views 
Central banks can differ in their evaluation of recent economic developments, structural changes and 
their policy implications. In order to highlight possible alternative assessments, in this section we 
outline two very different, intentionally polarised, views.  
The first is the “continuity” view, in which the central bank, while acknowledging the changes that have 
occurred of late, interprets them essentially as unusual “shocks” in the context of a fairly stable 
macroeconomic environment or “model of the economy”. Such a traditional view implies that the 
central bank is likely to set policy in the future rather as it has in the past, with little change in either 
strategic or tactical policy approaches as a result of the recent history.  
By contrast, in the second, or “new-environment”, view, the central bank sees recent economic 
developments as related to and reinforcing one another. Taken jointly, they would reflect a qualitative 
change in the macroeconomic environment. Such a change is not so easily captured by benchmark 
economic models and can point to a more significant modification to traditional policy guides. Such a 
central bank is more likely to adjust its beliefs regarding the operation of the economy and to make 
corresponding changes to its policy approach. 
The continuity view 
In the continuity view, the recent experience of longer expansions, more volatile financial markets and 
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reflecting the specific configuration of exogenous “shocks” hitting economies against the background 
of a broadly invariant set of structural relationships. Shocks vary in terms of their nature and the 
persistence of their effects. But, by and large, there is no major reason why they are likely to recur in 
future.
46 
In this view, the basic model of the economy through which developments are interpreted need not be 
changed much. In particular, growth in aggregate demand outpacing that of supply, and so a wider 
output gap, is seen as generating heightened upward pressure on prices. Price increases would tend 
to materialise with lags that, by and large, have not significantly changed. Analytically, this type of view 
tends to rely heavily on models where there is a close correlation between output gaps and inflation 




The task of the central bank in this world is well known. Simplifying somewhat, in order to keep 
inflation under control, around a formal or informal target level, the central bank keeps demand 
growing in line with potential while being mindful of possible untoward cost-push pressures. In turn, 
and crucially, the failure of inflation to rise or fall can be seen as a useful cross-check of estimates of 
excess demand and supply.
48 
In such a view, the role of financial developments in policy decisions is fairly modest. It reflects 
primarily the marginal contributions that such variables make to forecasts of output and inflation over a 
policy horizon of one to two years. For example, rapid growth of money or credit aggregates might be 
read as suggesting possible incipient inflation pressures, but because such indicators have been less 
useful in recent years as aides to forecasting, they might well be discounted. Similarly, possible 
financial imbalances, including rising household or business debt burdens, might be seen as 
suggesting downside risks to the outlook, but they would not generally be expected to play a central 
role. Indeed, in a period of rapid non-inflationary growth, high investment and strengthening 
productivity gains, faster debt growth might be seen as justified by more rapid anticipated growth in 
incomes and higher returns on investment. 
Looking back at developments in recent years, a central bank with this view might well consider the 
financial booms and busts, including financial distress, and associated fluctuations in credit and 
investment to have been largely the result of idiosyncratic factors, specific to the countries affected. 
Examples include deficiencies in the economic and financial infrastructure and/or inevitably slow 
learning in the wake of financial liberalisation. In other words, it would probably tend to regard these 
developments as episodic or exceptional rather than as tied to the general characteristics of the 
environment.  
The continuity view also has implications for the type of questions to which answers would be sought. 
For example, policymakers with this perspective might more naturally focus on understanding the 
reasons for the low output volatility in many industrialised countries in recent years than those for the 
increased volatility in economies experiencing severe financial strains.
49 Likewise, they might devote 
                                                       
46  This very common view of the business cycle, which emphasises the size and persistence of exogenous shocks, harks back 
to Frisch (1933). 
47  Here “distortions” should be interpreted as departures from economic efficiency, normally measured as departures from an 
equilibrium in which prices are fully flexible. The most popular example is the family of so-called New Keynesian models; 
see eg Woodford (2002) and Clarida et al (1999). 
48  Given the basic model of the economy adopted, it is not surprising that central bank behaviour has often been summarised 
through simple rules where the policy rate responds to output gaps and inflation. In the literature, rules drawn from this 
family have also frequently been employed to assess the optimality of policy, as in eg Taylor (1999). Of course, even their 
reasonable success in approximating policy by no means implies that this is the strategy that central banks follow ex ante. 
The analysis of inflationary pressures goes well beyond what can be captured by such simple relationships. On these, see, 
in particular, ECB (2001), which addresses the role of simple rules, and ECB (2000) more specifically on the issues 
concerning the measurement and usefulness of the concept of the output gap. 
49  There is, in fact, a considerable amount of research trying to understand the factors behind the comparatively low volatility 
of output in some of the industrialised countries over the last decade or so, mostly dealing with the US experience. Answers 
so far have focused primarily on a more favourable environment, in the form of positive or smaller exogenous shocks 
(eg Stock and Watson (2002) and Ahmed et al (2002)), structural changes such as better inventory management (eg Kahn 
et al (2002) and Edge and Laubach (2002)), better monetary policy (eg Clarida et al (2000)) and lower inflation (Blanchard 
and Simon (2001)). Lower inflation and better monetary policy have been stressed especially in the context of cross-country 
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considerable attention to developing better estimates of output gaps, especially in the context of 




By contrast, the “new-environment” view sees many of the recent developments as interrelated and 
potentially forming a novel backdrop for policy. This view emphasises endogenous forces in the 
system rather than external shocks. And it stresses the conjunction of three factors taking shape over 
the last decade or so: liberalised financial markets, low and stable inflation - underpinned by higher 
credibility of central banks’ anti-inflation commitment - and positive supply side developments. 
According to this view, financial liberalisation has meant that the financial system can more easily 
accommodate, and reinforce, fluctuations in economic activity. The financial system can act as an 
amplifying factor as a result of powerful procyclical forces. In the wake of liberalisation, this view sees 
access to external finance as more plentiful and more intimately driven by perceptions of, and appetite 
for, risk. And these can move strongly in sympathy with economic activity. Hence the highly procyclical 
nature of credit, asset prices and market indicators of risk, such as credit spreads. Thus, during 
booms, virtuous circles can develop, consisting of higher asset prices, muted risk perceptions, 
weakening external financing constraints, possibly an appreciating currency, greater capital 
deepening, rising productivity and higher profits. These processes then go into reverse during 
contractions. 
While such processes are a natural element of all business fluctuations, they can also go too far, if the 
system lacks sufficient built-in mechanisms to prevent it from becoming overstretched. In these 
instances, masked by benign economic conditions, financial imbalances and associated distortions in 
the real economy build up and the economy grows at an unsustainable pace. Unless sufficient 
defences are put in place during the upswing, the subsequent unwinding of such imbalances, and 
associated distortions in the real economy, can raise the risk of a substantial economic downturn, 
typically reinforced by financial strains. Ironically, this may be more likely to occur in the wake of 
positive developments on the supply side. These can justify the belief in permanently higher growth 
prospects and go hand in hand with heavy capital accumulation and hence endogenous 
improvements in productivity, profits and more attenuated upward pressure on prices. 
In this view, the success in attaining and maintaining low inflation, and the resulting increase in the 
perceived credibility of central banks, play a subtle role. On the one hand, this success has eliminated 
an important source of misallocation of resources and of financial instability. Obvious examples 
include real estate booms driven by attempts to hedge inflation risk, incentives to increase debt 
because of the interaction of inflation with the tax code, sharp increases in interest rates aimed at 
quelling inflation and broader inflation-induced distortions in the economy. On the other hand, it has 
contributed significantly to the attenuation of the inflation process. Under these conditions, excess 
aggregate demand may tend to be reflected in higher inflation more gradually than in the past.
52 Not 
least, prices and wages may be less likely to rise if economic agents feel that the authorities will not 
accommodate the increases. And in the absence of overt inflation, policy rates may fail to rise 
                                                       
50  For the importance of output gaps and changes in productivity trends for monetary policy, see Orphanides (2000). 
51  Various elements of this view have been articulated more fully in Borio and Lowe (2002a, 2003) and Borio et al (2001). In 
fact, this view has very old roots, although some of its aspects have been formalised only recently. For example, the 
Austrian school, with its emphasis on the role of credit in generating or supporting unsustainable booms, through their 
interaction with capital formation, is relevant here (eg von Mises (1912) and Hayek (1933)). In Schumpeter (1939) 
innovations played a much more integral role in business fluctuations. Pigou (1929) emphasised misperceptions of risk, 
while Kindleberger (1996) and Minsky (1982) took the potential destabilising role of finance much further. Fisher (1932) 
stressed the debt deflation dynamics following booms. More recent work has formalised the amplifying role of financial 
factors, seen as a mechanism that increases the persistence of financial shocks, drawing on the asymmetric information 
literature (eg Bernanke et al (1999b) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). In contrast to the Frischian view of business cycles, 
which focuses on exogenous shocks, the emphasis of the new-environment perspective on endogenous processes is more 
in line with the Burns and Mitchell (1946) NBER tradition, which highlights the interaction of profits, investment and credit 
(see, in particular, Zarnowitz (1992, 1999)). See also Stock and Watson (1991), Hamilton (1989) and Filardo and Gordon 
(1999) for empirical attempts to distinguish between these two types of business cycle using modern econometric methods. 
52  In an otherwise standard macro model, Amato and Shin (2003) show how inflation may actually provide a distorted signal of 
underlying developments in the economy in the presence of differential information (lack of “common knowledge”). BIS Papers No 19  27
 
sufficiently promptly to restrain the growth of imbalances in the economy. Moreover, there may be a 
risk that the very belief in the stability of the inflation process adds credence to the sustainability of the 
boom, by removing the most typical cause of the end of expansions.
53,54 
At least five distinguishing characteristics of this view stand out. 
First, the role it assigns to financial imbalances is potentially much greater than in the continuity view, 
and the risks that they are seen as raising may be very different. In the new-environment view, 
developing financial imbalances, if they appear to be fairly large, provide critical additional, and hence 
complementary, information about the likely future pressures on the economy. This information would 
not be available from traditional indicators of inflation pressures, since those indicators generally focus 
on the current and near-term degree of pressure on resources rather than on the pressures that might 
develop further out in the future, as financial imbalances unwind. Indeed, because such an unwinding 
could have a substantial negative impact on spending by trimming asset prices and adversely affecting 
intermediaries and funding markets, the real risk to which large financial imbalances may point is 
economic weakness and, with inflation initially low, possibly deflation. 
Second, monetary policy can play an important enabling role in the process. If the monetary reaction 
function of the authorities does not respond to financial imbalances as they build up unless excess 
demand pressures are seen as raising significant inflation risks, then the central bank may unwittingly 
accommodate an unsustainable boom in the economy. In this sense, monetary policy may fail to be 
sufficiently pre-emptive. 
Third, from this perspective the credibility of the central bank’s anti-inflation commitment can be a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the credibility reinforces other structural factors that may put a 
lid on inflationary pressures. On the other, with longer-term inflation expectations better anchored 
around the central banks’ inflation objectives, unsustainable booms may take longer to show up in 
overt inflation. This “paradox of credibility” means that the central bank can be a victim of its own 
success.
55 Conquering inflation can contribute to changes in the dynamics of the system that can 
mask the risks facing the economy. 
Fourth, evidence of low short-term output volatility is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
new-environment view. Indeed, fluctuations where financial imbalances play a larger role would 
typically be characterised by a prolonged and sustained upswing, which would allow and encourage 
the build-up of imbalances. If the data are predominantly drawn from such periods, short-term output 
volatility can easily be lower compared with a sequence of more traditional cycles. 
Finally, in the context of business fluctuations the two views stress different sources of “distortions” in 
the functioning of the economy and hence of welfare costs. The continuity view emphasises those 
from misalignments in relative prices of goods and services at a point in time, arising, for instance, 
from sticky prices. These distortions would disappear if inflation was zero. In this sense, and as a first 
                                                       
53  Note that this argument is quite different from the traditional one stressing the role of money illusion during the shift from an 
inflationary to a low-inflation environment. That argument emphasises the notion that agents may mistake nominal for real 
returns, and hence overestimate earnings and underestimate real debt burdens, thereby fuelling a credit-asset price boom - 
in effect, the mirror-image of the hypothesis used by Modigliani and Cohn (1979) to explain “excessively” low equity returns 
in the 1970s. This mechanism, though, may well have played a significant role during the disinflation phase and its 
aftermath. On this, see also McCauley et al (1999). 
54  It is worth stressing that, just as the continuity view would not rule out financial imbalances altogether, so the 
new-environment view would by no means contend that all cycles exhibit the same characteristics. Moreover, as the 
historical evidence amply demonstrates, and for very good reasons, high inflation can promote financial instability, 
especially in the wake of financial liberalisation. Rather, the point here is that the conjunction of liberalised financial markets 
and low and stable inflation can make the system more vulnerable to booms and busts of the kind described unless 
monetary policy is somehow capable of taking into account the altered balance of risks in the new environment. Moreover, 
as noted, prudential policy also has an important role to play as a first line of defence, and could relieve the burden on 
monetary policy, but this aspect is not discussed here. 
55  This paradox is discussed in Borio and Lowe (2002a, 2003), but elements can also be found elsewhere, notably in 
Goodfriend (2000a). See also Amato and Shin (2003), who show that in a model without common knowledge the public 
signal (assumed credible) provided by the central bank about the state of the economy (eg inflation outlook) could 
excessively condition private beliefs, thereby distorting the information that actual inflation would convey about the true 
underlying state of the economy (eg excess demand). 28  BIS Papers No 19
 
approximation, inflation could even be said to a sufficient statistic for them.
56 By contrast, the 
new-environment view emphasises those distortions impinging on intertemporal 
consumption/investment decisions, which would manifest themselves in financial imbalances.
57 These 
are seen as having larger costs in terms of consumption/output over time over the region of likely 
inflation rates in the current policy regime.
58 
Looking back at the experience in recent years, the new-environment view would detect the symptoms 
of a gradual change in the dynamics of the economy. The experiences in Japan, some countries in 
East Asia and, in several respects, recent developments in the United States and hence in the global 
economy share a common characteristic: investment-led booms that were reinforced by financial 
developments and that did not end up with rapidly rising inflation. In those cases where financial 
imbalances grew sufficiently large and unwound in a disruptive way, financial strains emerged, helping 
to put downward pressure on prices.
59 
The new-environment view sees the parallel with the economic environment under the gold standard 
mentioned earlier as far from purely coincidental or of little relevance for today. As noted, at that time, 
too, inflation was generally low and expected to remain low while financial markets were lightly 
regulated and globally integrated. And occasionally, new technologies (eg railways, the electric motor) 
offered large but difficult-to-estimate returns to investors.
60 In that environment, financial imbalances 
were a prominent feature of the economic landscape, and often led both to international and to 
domestic crises with significant macroeconomic effects.
61 For instance, the US stock market and real 
estate booms of the late 1920s - like the more recent Japanese experience - were followed by a period 
of protracted economic weakness and deflation. 
IV. Policy  implications 
As can be seen, the two views of recent events and the dynamics of the economy suggest somewhat 
different policy prescriptions with regard to the identification of inflationary and deflationary pressures 
and the appropriate monetary policy response. These differences revolve largely around the role 
played by financial imbalances in the policy framework. They are arguably sharper, or more 
controversial, in the phase when financial imbalances are building up than when they are unwinding. 
                                                       
56  This is, of course, an oversimplification, which holds only in certain models. For instance, movements in output or the output 
gap are, to some extent, presumed to reflect distortions independently of inflation. Furthermore, wage inflation more directly 
can represent distortions related to incomplete nominal wage adjustment. However, to a first approximation, the absence of 
low and stable inflation is largely indicative of the main welfare losses in a common class of models with microeconomic 
foundations designed to shed light on the proper role of monetary policy. 
57  In other words, investment is put in place to meet future demand that subsequently fails to materialise. These distortions 
could be mainly sectoral (eg a construction boom) or more generalised. In an essay in its Annual Report, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland (1998), drawing on work by Robertson (1926), also cautions against the risk of giving excessive 
weight to low and stable inflation as a signal that the economy is expanding at a sustainable pace in the presence of signs 
of financial imbalances. The corresponding historical debate on the value of “productivity norms” is reviewed in Selgin 
(1997). 
58  As a result, capturing these costs rigorously would arguably require going beyond mainstream models, where distortions in 
intertemporal saving/investment decisions are ruled out by the joint assumptions of a representative agent and rational 
expectations. Such alternative models may well be capable of representing the economic processes consistent with the 
new-environment view without necessarily appealing to elements of bounded rationality or even to transitional learning. For 
example, research indicates that rational departures of asset values from fundamentals can be sustained in the context of 
short horizons (linked to principal/agent problems) and lack of common knowledge (eg Allen and Gale (2000), Allen et al 
(2003) and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)). At the same time, the asymmetric nature of the boom-bust fluctuations could 
be grounded on features of financial markets and the economy. For example, short selling constraints (which might be 
justified on the basis of asymmetric information and concerns with counterparty/credit risk) may make positive departures 
from fundamentals more likely than negative ones (eg Carey (1990)). Similarly, the natural non-linearities linked to balance 
sheet constraints, the zero lower bound on interest rates and capital overhangs could explain specific characteristics of the 
busts. Needless to say, incorporating all of these features in a macro model represents a major challenge. 
59  This excludes the comparatively short bursts of inflation following some currency crises. 
60  For instance, see David (1990) on the importance of the adoption of the electric dynamo. 
61  Goodhart (2003) and Goodhart and De Largy (1999), among others, have stressed this point. BIS Papers No 19  29
 
While the imbalances are still building, the new-environment view might well suggest a more 
purposeful response with a view to restraining the cumulative process. Once imbalances begin to 
unwind, and particularly if they do so in an abrupt and disorderly manner, the new-environment view 
may lead to a somewhat prompter and more intense policy easing in order to blunt the effects of the 
unwinding on the aggregate economy.  
Policy while imbalances are developing 
In the continuity view, a boom in financial markets would be seen as likely to contribute to stronger 
aggregate demand, leading in turn to pressures on resources that would need to be countered by 
monetary policy to avoid a build-up of inflation pressures.
62 The size of the appropriate policy 
tightening would depend on the perceived effects of the financial market imbalances on aggregate 
demand, primarily through cost of capital effects on investment spending and wealth effects on 
household expenditures.  
In practice, however, the effects of the cost of capital on investment are difficult to pin down,
63 and 
wealth effects on household spending have also proved difficult to estimate, especially in the case of 
residential real estate.
64 As a result, policymakers might wish to wait until measures of resource use or 
actual price rises suggest increased inflation pressures. If in a particular period of rapid expansion and 
high resource use inflation pressures remained in check, perhaps because of well anchored inflation 
expectations and robust investment and underlying productivity growth, then the perceived need for 
policy tightening would be diminished, and policy might well remain on hold for a considerable period. 
Even if financial imbalances were increasing, policymakers would be unlikely to change policy so long 
as growth and inflation were well behaved. 
If the imbalances eventually became large enough to be seen as a risk to the outlook, policymakers 
might wish to take actions to help support the resiliency of the financial system in the event of a rapid 
unwinding. Such actions might include public statements warning of the potential risks, as well as 
efforts to ensure the quality of prudential supervision. In addition, the central bank would be ready to 
ease policy if needed and to provide liquidity in the event of financial market turbulence. 
At least three factors explain the central bank’s reluctance to respond to the imbalances by tightening 
policy with a view to containing them.
65 
First, as noted, according to the continuity view it is very difficult to identify financial imbalances with a 
sufficient degree of confidence. The fundamental problem is that financial market participants have 
access to roughly the same information as policymakers and are presumably investing their funds 
rationally. Thus, in concluding that there were significant imbalances, policymakers would have to 
believe that their judgment was better than that of millions of investors who have their own money on 
the line. Presumably such a judgment would require a high level of proof.
66 Moreover, this view would 
                                                       
62  To varying degrees, elements of this view can be found, for instance, in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Vickers (1999b), 
Meltzer (2003), Mishkin (2003), Goodfriend (2003), Svensson (2002), Greenspan (1999, 2002) and Bernanke (2002a). 
Not infrequently, the question is put in terms of the appropriate response to asset price “bubbles”. 
63  See Clark (1979, 1993). 
64  For recent analyses of the effects of household wealth on consumer spending, see Davis and Palumbo (2001) and Dynan 
and Maki (2001). The effects of residential real estate are more complicated because higher house prices both raise wealth 
and boost the cost of housing. The effects are not necessarily offsetting, however, because some households expect to sell 
their houses and move to smaller ones in the future, so that they can begin to spend more now. See Lehnart (2002) and 
Case et al (2002) for recent estimates. Housing wealth may also affect consumption through its use as collateral (Lustig and 
Van Nieuwerburgh (2002)). 
65  In this volume, Lim discusses the difficulties of identifying asset price bubbles and responding to them through monetary 
policy in Korea. 
66  One possible exception would include cases in which the incentives of investors were distorted by government interventions 
or other factors. For example, mispriced deposit insurance or implicit government backing may lead some investors to 
provide funds to intermediaries at rates that do not reflect the risks taken by those intermediaries. As a result, intermediaries 
may take on excessive risk, trimming spreads on riskier credits and potentially distorting the pattern of investment. Both the 
intermediaries and their customers may thus be more likely to fail than would be the case without the government 
intervention, potentially increasing the risks of a financial crisis with adverse effects on the real economy. However, in such 
cases, rather than using monetary policy in an attempt to limit the growth of imbalances, a policymaker would be inclined to 
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stress that not all financial imbalances need be disruptive: some could unwind in a gradual and benign 
way if action is not taken, making the expected costs of waiting relatively small. Finally, for much the 
same reasons, even if the imbalances were identifiable in principle, a sufficiently firm judgment would 
be unlikely to be reached early enough to justify a policy tightening. Indeed, by the time this judgment 
was formed, the risk of a spontaneous unwinding, coupled with the lags associated with monetary 
policy, might make a tightening counterproductive. 
A second factor militating against a response is a concern about its effects, specifically about the risk 
of causing more volatility in the economy, rather than mitigating it. The financial imbalance may be 
rather unresponsive to policy actions: speculative pressures could be too strong and expected returns 
too high. As a result, attempts to restrain them could derail other, more expenditure-sensitive, sectors, 
causing the very recession that policy was designed to avert. 
This type of concern has been formalised recently in a fairly standard empirical model of the 
US  economy, where a close relationship exists between output gaps and inflation, augmented by 
exogenous “near rational” bubbles in stock prices.
67 The results suggest that central bankers who 
stabilise expected inflation may be better off responding only to the anticipated effects of stock prices 
on expected future inflation than they would be if they respond to the size of the bubble as well.
68 
A final consideration is the very difficult political economy issues raised by a tighter monetary policy. 
If the central bank is successful in constraining financial imbalances, it will, by definition, disappoint the 
expectations of many investors, and it may be blamed for that disappointment. Indeed, given the likely 
effects of a tightening on output and earnings, the central bank may not be able to demonstrate 
convincingly, even ex post, that the action was necessary. Moreover, the decision to tighten when 
output growth is robust but inflation appears to remain in check would be difficult to justify to the 
public.
69 The conventional argument, that tighter policy is necessary to combat inflationary pressures 
and permit a longer expansion, might well seem inappropriate if the intent of the policy, at least in the 
near term, is to slow the economy and initiate the unwinding of the financial imbalances. And if the 
central bank indicates that it is attempting to slow the economy in order to lower asset prices, the 
public might well wonder why doing so is desirable given that consumer prices remain stable. 
In contrast, policymakers following the new-environment view would be more likely to see growing 
financial imbalances as a threat to economic stability and to believe that monetary policy can be used 
to lean against them. Moreover, while recognising the serious political economy constraints, they 
would not see them as necessarily insurmountable over time.
70 
As regards identification, the new-environment view would find some support in recent research
71 
indicating that focusing on the question of whether an asset price bubble is in the making - the most 
common approach - may not be the best way of posing the problem. According to this research, more 
mileage can be gained by trying to identify the configuration of symptoms that may foreshadow future 
generalised financial distress, with significant macroeconomic costs. This work suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                                       
address the distortions directly, for example by changing the faulty regulations, or to use prudential supervision to limit their 
effects on the behaviour of individual institutions. 
67  See Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001). In addition, the model assumes that, conditional on the cost of capital, investment 
decisions are based on fundamental value considerations only. 
68  Of course, even in this model, strictly speaking, fully optimal policy would include a response to the bubble, in so far as this 
is a state variable (Filardo (1999, 2001)). Bernanke and Gertler’s conclusions are based on the evaluation of a set of 
“reasonable” simple policy rules. In fact, Cecchetti et al (2000), based on more general policy rules, find that better 
outcomes can be obtained if monetary policy responds more to stock prices than would be justified by anticipated effects on 
inflation alone. Bernanke and Gertler (2001), however, question the generality of the results. 
69  See, in particular, Yamaguchi (1999a). 
70  There is a rather separate literature, not discussed here, also suggesting that it might be appropriate to place a greater 
weight on asset prices. This, however, is couched in terms of a redefinition of the inflation index, going beyond an index of 
the price of currently produced/consumed goods and services. See Alchian and Klein (1973), Goodhart (1995) and, for a 
short review, Filardo (1999). And even if it is taken as given that the correct measure refers to current services and goods, 
Goodhart (2001a) has stressed that, in practice, the way housing prices are treated may deviate considerably from the 
conceptually correct measure, with first order effects on the corresponding price index. While not examined here, this issue 
deserves greater attention. 
71  See, in particular, Borio and Lowe (2002a,b), building on previous work by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). BIS Papers No 19  31
 
cumulative deviations of asset prices and aggregate private credit from historical trends, especially if 
also accompanied by cumulative real exchange rate appreciation, can yield reasonably reliable signals 
of pending financial crises (Box).
72 In turn, the financial crises considered are episodes that have been 
shown to be associated with large output losses.
73 In other words, this research suggests that such 
variables may contain useful information about the sustainability of the expansion and risks to the 
outlook. These findings also suggest that policymakers might be able to respond to developing 
imbalances with monetary policy before they reach a stage where a spontaneous unwinding is 
imminent. To be sure, more work needs to be done in order to make such judgments fully operational. 
Even so, given that this line of research is in its infancy, considerable scope for improvement would 
appear to exist.
74 
Moreover, from the perspective of the new-environment view, the level of proof would not need to be 
as high as for the continuity view. Even if it was granted that the authorities had information similar to 
that of market participants, they have different responsibilities and incentives. For one, market 
participants would not internalise the macroeconomic effects of their collective actions.
75 By contrast, 
the central bank would be expected to weigh the risks to the macroeconomic outlook before taking 
decisions. And a new-environment perspective would tend to tilt the risks towards action, rather than 
inaction, given that the occurrence of potentially destabilising financial imbalances is seen as an 
inherent feature of the economic landscape. 
As regards the effects of policy action, since the new-environment view sees a role for monetary 
policy in accommodating the build-up of financial imbalances, it also more naturally perceives a 
potential for policy to contain them. The  lack of evidence of rising inflation pressures, if it causes 
policymakers to stay their hand, can contribute to market participants’ beliefs that financial market 
trends are sustainable. Conversely, by tightening policy pre-emptively, policymakers may be able to 
limit the build-up of imbalances, and so avoid later volatility. Indeed, by being seen as unwilling to 
accommodate them, policymakers may help to make such imbalances less likely to emerge in the first 
place.
76 Following a policy tightening, a slowdown in the economy would indeed be envisaged in order 
to restrain what would be perceived as an unsustainable expansion, much like when the central bank 
raises interest rates in response to rising inflation. And as in the case of inflation, the induced 
slowdown today would be seen as a way of avoiding a bigger slowdown in the future. 
                                                       
72  One might also think of using the level of investment or of the capital stock to identify the imbalances. Quite apart from 
information lags, however, as described in Borio and Lowe (2002a,b) financial variables appear to outperform investment. 
Moreover, difficulties in measuring the capital stock make it much harder to rely on this variable, which, at least 
conceptually, would be superior to the investment flow. The fact that the imbalances may sometimes be concentrated in 
particular sectors (eg real estate) can complicate matters further. See also Annex 1 on the potential complementary use of 
measures of the natural rate of interest, possibly to cross-check developments. 
73  See, in particular, the work by Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) and Bordo et al (2001). 
74  A concern with these types of studies is that the “predictions” of crises are actually made ex post. There is a risk that while 
one can develop such indicator models after the fact, it may be much harder to do so in advance. For example, indicators of 
coming financial crises identified before the Asian crisis were not very helpful in anticipating it (Furman and Stiglitz (1998) 
and Corsetti et al (1999)). One possible reason for this difficulty is that to the degree that policymakers and market 
participants learn from past experiences of market excess, they would presumably be less likely to make the same mistakes 
again. But they may well make new ones. As a result, indicators of past crises may well not be of as much use when 
employed to forecast future crises. Thus, policymakers cannot focus solely on the sources of past imbalances, but also 
need be on the lookout for new and unexpected sources of vulnerability. Such a broader focus complicates further the 
identification of excesses to which policy should respond. 
75  Partly because of these different incentives and constraints, a new-environment perspective would also more naturally 
highlight those forces in financial markets that would tend to generate destabilising behaviour and prevent the correction of 
overvaluations, even if perceived. The possible factors range widely, including biases in the assessment of risk, wedges 
between individual and “collective” rationality and constraints on arbitrage. These mechanisms may result in excessive 
procyclicality of the financial system. For an elaboration, see eg Borio et al (2001). 
76  See eg Blanchard (2000). 32  BIS Papers No 19
 
Box 1 
Identifying financial imbalances 
In recent years, an increasing volume of work has been devoted to the development of leading indicators of 
financial crises. While much of it has addressed specifically the identification of currency crises, more recently 
greater attention has begun to be paid to banking crises too.
77 This literature, given its focus on financial 
stability, has had little influence on the thinking of monetary economists. As noted, much of the discussion 
about the role of asset prices in monetary policy has been couched in terms of identification and responses to 
“bubbles”. The work on crises, however, can provide useful insights about the set of symptoms that signal 
future financial strains with macroeconomic consequences. As such, it arguably addresses more directly the 
set of developments that central banks should care about. 
Building on a very useful approach employed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), recently Borio and Lowe 
(2002a,b) have sought to develop sharper indicators of financial sector vulnerability in both industrial and 
emerging market countries.
78 For the sake of comparability with previous work, they take a standard definition 
of banking crisis (Bordo et al (2001)). As In Kaminsky and Reinhart, the usefulness of indicators is judged on 
the basis of the noise-to-signal ratio, ie in essence the ratio of wrong to correct signals. However, because of 
the differential costs of making incorrect predictions, somewhat greater weight is placed on predicting a 
minimum percentage of crises.
79 
This work departs from previous efforts in at least five respects. First, it relies exclusively on ex ante 
information, as required by policymakers.
80 Second, it focuses on cumulative processes, measured in terms 
of deviations (“gaps”) of the key variables from trends based on ex ante data. This is supposed to capture the 
build-up of vulnerabilities. Third, it looks only at a very limited set of variables: private credit to GDP, real asset 
prices, investment and, more recently, the real exchange rate too. Because of data limitations, the only asset 
prices used are those of equities. Fourth, it calibrates the signal by considering the variables jointly, rather 
than on a univariate basis. Finally, it allows for multiple horizons, on the view that the precise timing of a crisis 
is essentially unpredictable. 
Box Tables 1 and 2 summarise the main results. At least four points stand out.  
•  Taking indicators individually, the credit gap is the best: it has the lowest noise-to-signal ratio and 
correctly predicts the largest number of crises. At a 4% threshold, 80% of the crises are predicted, with 
about one observation incorrectly classified (crisis/non-crisis) every five or seven, depending on the 
horizon. By contrast, equity prices have information content, but are a relatively noisy signal (the gap is 
calibrated at around 40%).
81 Note that, if the output gap is included for comparison purposes, it 
performs more poorly. 
•  The noise-to-signal ratio can be considerably improved by calibrating the signals jointly, albeit at the 
cost of losing predictions of some crises. For example, at a one-year horizon, if credit and asset prices 
are taken jointly, over 40% of the crises are successfully predicted, and the noise-to-signal ratio is 
almost halved (one observation incorrectly classified every 12). For a horizon up to three years, some 
60% of the crises are predicted, and the noise-to-signal ratio is more than halved (one in 20).
82 
•  Adding the real exchange rate gap, by considering situations in which a credit gap coexists with either 
an exchange rate gap or an asset price gap, raises the percentage of crises predicted to well over 60%, 
with little change in the noise-to-signal ratio. 
 
 
                                                       
77  For reviews, see IMF (2002), Bell and Pain (2000), Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) and Hawkins and Klau (2000). 
78  The sample covers 34 countries, the data are annual and cover the period 1960 to 1999. See those articles for further 
information on the methodology. 
79  The noise-to-signal ratio could be reduced a lot by making the signal so conservative that hardly any crises would be 
predicted. 
80  The information is ex ante, but not necessarily real-time. Arguably, at annual frequencies this is less of an issue. 
81  In the results shown, the equity gap is introduced with a two-year lead, ie the level of the equity gap two years earlier is 
used. This is done because of the typical lead-lag relationships and because property prices tend to follow equity prices with 
a lag of around two years. In the absence of property price data, the equity price gap might then act as a proxy, at least in 
some cases. 
82  Typically, lengthening the horizon even further increases the percentage of crises predicted while reducing the noise-to-
signal ratio. BIS Papers No 19  33
 
•  The size of the optimum thresholds and the predictive performance are broadly similar across the group 
of industrial and emerging market countries. However, equity prices appear to perform relatively better 
for industrial countries, and the exchange rate for emerging market countries, at least over short 
horizons. This is consistent with the greater importance that the exchange rate tends to play in the latter 
group. In fact, for industrial countries, once the equity price is included, the exchange rate does not 
appear to add any useful information. 
These set of results suggest a number of conclusions. First, focusing on asset prices per se and the question 
of whether a “bubble” is in train may not be the most useful way of phrasing the question. A combination of 
symptoms does a better job of assessing the risk of subsequent strains. Second, at least at annual 
frequencies, the output gap is a poor indicator of unsustainable booms and future financial distress. Since this 
distress tends to accompany severe economic weakness, information that may be useful to frame monetary 
policy decisions could be missed. Indicators of financial imbalances appear to contain such additional 
information. Finally, the findings could be interpreted as saying that it should be possible to form judgments 
about the build-up of vulnerabilities with a reasonable degree of confidence. However, obviously more work 
needs to be done in order to provide a sounder and operational basis for policy decisions. 
 
Box Table 1 
Indicators of banking crises: all countries 
Single indicators (gaps)
1  Joint indicators (gaps)
1 
Credit
3 (4) Asset  price
4 (40) Exchange rate
5 
(7)  Output (2)  Credit (4) and 
asset price (40) 
Credit (4) and 
(asset price (40) 





























1  0.23  80 0.35 50 0.31  0.55  0.57 28 0.14 43 0.13 63 
2  0.20  80 0.24 65 0.28  0.55  0.39 38 0.08 55 0.10 68 
3  0.18  80 0.19 73 0.26  0.58  0.34 40 0.06 60 0.08 70 
1  A gap is measured as a percentage point or percentage deviation from an ex ante, recursively calculated Hodrick-Prescott trend; the size of 
the threshold is shown in brackets.   
2  A signal is correct if a crisis takes place in any one of the years included in the horizon ahead. Noise is 
identified as mistaken predictions within the same horizon. Given the data frequency and difficulties in assigning crises to a specific date, year 
one includes, in addition, the current year.   
3  Credit is measured as the ratio of private sector credit to GDP.   
4  Real equity price index.   
5  Real 
effective exchange rate. 
Source: Borio and Lowe (2002a,b). 
 
Box Table 2 
Indicators of banking crises: industrial and emerging market countries 
Industrial Emerging  market 
Credit (4) and 
asset price (40) 
Credit (4) and 
exchange rate 
(4) 
Credit (4) and 
(asset price (40) 
or exchange rate 
(20)
1) 
Credit (4) and 
asset price (40) 
Credit (4) and 
exchange rate 
(5) 
Credit (4) and 
(asset price (40) 




























1  0.09 50 0.11 44 0.09 50 0.23 38 0.15 58 0.16 67 
2  0.06 56 0.10 44 0.06 56 0.12 54 0.11 58 0.12 71 
3  0.04 63 0.10 44 0.04 63 0.08 58 0.10 58 0.09 75 
1  Or higher. 
Source: Borio and Lowe (2002a,b). 34  BIS Papers No 19
 
Some of these points have been formalised in models that, contrary to the more standard ones, allow 
monetary policy to have an impact on the course of the financial imbalances.
83 In these models, the 
cost of acting pre-emptively is that tighter policy and the unwinding of the current degree of 
imbalances may cause deviations of output and inflation from the central bank’s goals in the near 
term. The advantage of doing so is that by ending the imbalances sooner, policymakers can reduce 
the expected volatility of output and inflation later on, when the by-then larger imbalances ultimately do 
unwind. Clearly, if the central bank has sufficient confidence in its assessments, both of the existence 
of the imbalances and of its ability to use policy to influence them, tighter policy could be seen as 
appropriate.
84,85 
Technical and operational issues aside, powerful political economy constraints on a more 
pre-emptive monetary policy stance vis-à-vis financial imbalances remain. From a new-environment 
perspective, however, these are not seen as exogenous. Rather, they are regarded as reflecting to a 
considerable extent current thinking about the dynamics of the economy, which determines 
perceptions of the balance of risks and the likely costs of alternative policy responses. These 
perceptions would be seen as excessively coloured by the inflationary phase of the postwar period - a 
phase which, in fact, may be regarded as rather exceptional from a longer-term historical standpoint.
86 
Policy once imbalances start to unwind 
Assuming that imbalances unwind in a costly manner for the economy, the broad contours of the 
policy response are not all that different across the two views.  
Under the continuity view, declines in asset prices and tightening of credit conditions would be 
interpreted as adverse shocks, and easier policy presumably would be deployed to offset their effects 
on aggregate demand. The size of the appropriate easing would depend on movements in asset 
prices and an assessment of the corresponding effects on spending. Any knock-on effects, such as 
difficulties at some financial institutions or in some financial markets, could be addressed with 
additional policy action or emergency liquidity provision as seems appropriate. 
While the new-environment view sees insufficiently tight policy as partly responsible for the 
development of imbalances, once those imbalances begin to unwind it may well justify a more rapid 
and substantial easing of policy in response to the perceived future evolution of the economy and the 
associated downside risks. Rather than regarding the unwinding of imbalances as one or more 
isolated shocks, a new-environment central bank would perceive them as part of a sequence of 
closely linked events. It would see them as reflecting, and potentially leading to, a broad set of related 
adjustments to financial markets and spending patterns. As a result, it might be more sensitive to a 
number of possible downside risks to the economic outlook and to the headwinds that could numb the 
                                                       
83   See Kent and Lowe (1997) or (1998). Bordo and Jeanne (2002) reach similar conclusions about the appropriateness of a 
policy tightening during the boom in a simple model without an asset price bubble but allowing for the possibility of 
collateral-induced credit crunches and for the endogeneity of credit and asset prices with respect to monetary policy. 
Blanchard (2000), too, argues that a monetary response may be appropriate, stressing the compositional aggregate 
demand effects of the bubble and, in particular, the risk of over-investment; see also eg Chirinko and Schaller (2001) for 
evidence of the impact of the stock market bubble on investment in Japan. Dupor (2002) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) 
show that in microfounded models with distortions of the type discussed here inflation is not a sufficient statistic for 
departures from economic efficiency, so that stabilising inflation would not be optimal. Depending on the specific distortion 
assumed, a response to asset prices over and above their implications for inflation stabilisation may thus be appropriate. In 
contrast to Dupor, however, Gilchrist and Leahy tend to play down the role of asset prices, noting that other variables would 
contain the relevant information. Within the central banking community, more recently King (2002), Bean (2002) and 
Bäckstrom (2002) have not ruled out the possibility of a monetary policy response to the build-up of imbalances. See also 
Mussa (2003) for a similar position. 
84   Ultimately, therefore, the appropriateness of a response depends on beliefs about the “model” describing the behaviour of 
the economy (including the imbalances) and the degree of uncertainty surrounding those beliefs. This point is clearly 
illustrated in Filardo (2001). 
85   As discussed in more detail in the next section, it is important to note that using policy to respond to financial imbalances 
does not reflect a desire by the central bank to target financial markets or asset prices per se. Rather, these imbalances are 
used as important information variables in the context of the overall policy strategy. They are seen as reflecting, and 
contributing to, distortions in the real economy and, as such, as containing critical additional information about the future 
behaviour of output and inflation. 
86   See Borio and Lowe (2002a) or (2003) for an elaboration of this point. BIS Papers No 19  35
 
effects of policy. These could include the reversal of risk perceptions among economic agents, and 
hence higher risk premia and a more general withdrawal from risk-taking; a deterioration in the 
balance sheets of borrowers and intermediaries, possibly including serious strains; and sharp declines 
in (some types of) investment, owing to the overhang of previous capital accumulation. 
At the same time, this stronger response by the new-environment central bank would need to be 
predicated on the belief that the unwinding of imbalances could not be reversed but simply be 
cushioned by its policy actions. Otherwise, the risk of prolonging imbalances further could restrain its 
hand. 
In fact, a possible implication of the new-environment view is that spending during the recessions and 
recoveries that follow unsustainable booms may well be unbalanced. To the extent that the preceding 
boom was investment-driven, the resulting capital overhang would weigh on investment spending 
once the boom came to an end. Thus, for a time spending would be very dependent on consumption. 
More generally, the imbalances seen during the boom could be reflected in the sectoral distribution of 
spending afterwards. As a result, central banks may find that the easing of policy undertaken in 
response to unwinding imbalances may contribute to the building of new imbalances in other sectors. 
For example, the rapid easing in a number of countries in past years as imbalances in the technology 
sector were reversed may have contributed to a run-up in house prices and so to imbalances in that 
sector that may need to be unwound at some stage. Such unbalanced spending patterns may 
significantly complicate the calibration of a policy response.  
The possible importance of the zero bound 
An added concern for policymakers once financial imbalances begin to unwind is that monetary policy 
may not be sufficiently effective to return the economy to potential because it is constrained by the 
zero bound on nominal interest rates. This possibility looms larger in the current environment because 
of the substantial decline in inflation over the past two decades. With actual and expected inflation of 
5 or even 10%, as was common 20 years or so ago, the central bank could respond to adverse shocks 
by cutting the nominal policy rate to a low level, thereby easily generating negative real policy interest 
rates if (temporarily) needed. By contrast, with actual and expected inflation of only 1 or 2%, if a 
substantial adverse shock damps output by enough to push inflation to zero or below, and inflation 
expectations follow, then the central bank might not be able to engineer the required reduction in 
ex ante real rates even by cutting the policy rate to zero. 
Such an adverse outcome would appear more likely in the new-environment view. In the continuity 
view, hitting the zero bound would require a series of adverse shocks that might seem improbable. By 
contrast, according to the new-environment view the forces generated by the unwinding of widespread 
financial imbalances would be expected to reinforce one another, causing a sharper decline in output 
and inflation. As a result, policymakers would wish to lower the real policy rate further, but with lower 
actual inflation weighing on inflation expectations, they might not be able to do so. 
How important the zero bound constraint is judged to be depends on two assessments by 
policymakers. First, are very low or even negative real policy rates likely to be necessary to stabilise 
the economy? And second, is the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates likely to keep 
policymakers from achieving sufficiently low real rates, if they are called for? The actual behaviour of 
real and nominal interest rates during past periods of economic weakness may shed light on these two 
issues. 
The behaviour of the real federal funds rate over the postwar period suggests that periods of negative 
real rates are not exceptional. Graph IV.1 shows two estimates of the real federal funds rate from the 
mid-1950s to the present.
87 By either measure, the real policy rate appears to have been negative 
during some periods of economic weakness, most notably in the 1970s. While these periods may have 
reflected in part a sluggish policy response to inflation pressures and, arguably, an undesirably easy 
                                                       
87  One measure uses the actual lagged four-quarter change in the chain-type price index for personal consumption 
expenditure as a proxy for expected inflation, while the other uses mean inflation expectations from the Michigan survey. 
This graph and the next are from English (2000). King (1999) uses the Livingstone survey and the one-year Treasury yield. 
He finds fewer quarters of negative real rates over a comparable period. However, the one-year rate would fall to zero only if 
the real funds rate was expected to remain at zero for a year, and the term premium on the one-year bill was zero. 36  BIS Papers No 19
 
policy stance, they also suggest that policymakers may value the option of generating negative real 
rates at certain times. 
 
 
Moreover, with actual and expected inflation well contained, policymakers’ actions may be more likely 
to be constrained by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Evidence on the possible role of the 
zero bound in a low-inflation environment can be gleaned from the behaviour of interest rates during 
the gold standard era in the United States (1879-1933). As noted earlier, this period was marked by 
very low average inflation, and expected inflation was probably very low as well.
88 Unfortunately, there 
are no data on short-term Treasury yields before 1920. As a result, Graph IV.2 shows the short-term 
Treasury rate from 1920 on, and the call money rate over the entire period.
89 When the Treasury bill 
rate was near zero in the 1930s, the call money rate was about 1%, suggesting that the risk premium 
demanded by those providing call money was about 1%. Over the period from 1879 to 1914, the call 
money rate fell to about 1% on a number of occasions, generally near NBER business cycle troughs 
(eg 1885 and 1894). These low call money rates suggest that the zero bound on the short-term risk-
free rate may well have been binding in those periods. Of course, there was no central bank in the 
United States at that time, and it is possible that policymakers could have avoided the zero bound. 
Therefore, making any inferences about the current environment is hazardous. Nonetheless, these 
observations might be taken to suggest that the zero bound could constrain central banks that have 
built solid anti-inflation credentials. 
Admittedly, even if policymakers are temporarily constrained by the zero bound, the real policy rate 
may be low enough to allow the economy gradually to return to potential. However, there is a risk that 
if the effects of the unwinding of financial imbalances are sufficiently large, the economy could get 
stuck in a deflationary trap, with output below potential, prices falling and the policy rate at zero.
90 To 
be sure, such an outcome may be unlikely: despite the relevance of the zero bound in the late 
19th century, the US economy did not get caught in this way until the 1930s, when policy is thought to 
have been poor. Nevertheless, the recent Japanese experience suggests that a deflationary trap is 
more than a theoretical possibility. Such an outcome would presumably be a greater concern from the 
perspective of the new-environment view. 
 
                                                       
88  For a discussion of inflation expectations during the gold standard period, see Barsky and DeLong (1991). 
89  The call money rate was the rate charged on short-term liquid loans backed by securities. 
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A deflationary trap is of particular concern because, once the economy has fallen into one, the policy 
alternatives are unappealing and their effectiveness less certain.  
As regards monetary operations, with interest rates already at zero, the central bank can only inject 
additional liquidity (bank excess reserves) into the system. If this is done through short-term 
operations in government securities, significant effects are unlikely, since the assets involved are 
(nearly) perfect substitutes for reserves.
91 The central bank could also resort to possibly less 
conventional operations.
92 These could range from outright purchases of long-term government bonds 
or foreign exchange to private claims of various kinds. Through these, the central bank may even 
attempt to peg the prices of some of the corresponding assets, such as long-term rates. These 
operations could well have some expansionary effects, depending on the degree of substitutability of 
the corresponding instruments in private portfolios. But those effects could be small and require very 
large operations, thereby possibly straining markets and the balance sheet of the central bank.
93 
Moreover, at least in some countries the central bank’s ability to implement such policies would be 
limited by statutory constraints.
94 
At a more strategic level, one approach that has been suggested is that the central bank could commit 
to a higher inflation rate in the future in order to lower longer-term real interest rates.
95 Alternatively, a 
price level target could be adopted. A price level target would have the additional merit of acting as a 
built-in stabiliser: as deflation progressed, the expected degree of reflation would increase.
96 However, 
as Japanese authorities have pointed out, these proposals will the ends but not the means. A promise 
of higher inflation in the future at a time when prices are falling and there is considerable slack seems 
unlikely to be credible.
97 Moreover, investors might reasonably expect that the central bank would 
choose to limit future inflation once the economy had recovered.
98 
                                                       
91  For a discussion of the Bank of Japan monetary operations, including the shift from targeting the call rate to targeting 
current account balances (excess reserves), see Borio (2001). For a detailed assessment of the effects of quantitative 
easing, see Kimura et al in this volume. 
92  See Bernanke (2002). 
93  See, for example, King (1999) and Blinder (2000). Of course, the constraint on the size of the operations may not be 
regarded as relevant, given the exceptional circumstances (eg Fukao (2002)). 
94  See Clouse et al (2000). 
95 See  Krugman  (1998). 
96  See Svensson (2002). Note that the gold standard may have served as a credible commitment to a future price level target, 
helping to limit the effects of the zero bound in the United States until 1933. See English (2000) for a discussion. 
97  Yamaguchi (1999a) has stressed this point. 
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Another, possibly complementary, approach would be to push down the exchange rate, or peg it at a 
depreciated level.
99 While the presence of financial sector strains could reduce its effectiveness by 
dampening the supply response, this strategy could at least boost demand for the tradable sector and 
improve its profitability. This strategy, however, could be perceived as of the “beggar-thy-neighbour” 
kind. This could cause frictions with trading partners, especially if undertaken by a large economy and 
in a context of more generalised economic weakness. Thus, the degree to which the business cycles 
in various countries are synchronised may influence the ability of a particular country to employ 
devaluation to combat the zero bound. And to the extent that the globalisation of financial markets has 
increased the likelihood that financial imbalances affect multiple countries at more or less the same 
time, there may be less latitude for unilateral exchange rate policy than in the past. 
Other, even more extreme, policies have been suggested to escape from a deflationary trap. For 
example, it has been argued that a tax on the monetary base could, by pushing the bound on nominal 
interest rates below zero, provide policymakers with greater latitude for policy easing.
100 But taxes on 
currency holdings could adversely affect sentiment, and could also risk damage to the role of currency 
as the means of payment.
101 
Such desperate-sounding proposals highlight the potential difficulties the zero bound in the context of 
a deflationary trap can pose for monetary policymakers. These difficulties, in turn, suggest that other, 
complementary and mutually reinforcing policies may be appropriate to generate the necessary 
increase in aggregate demand while relieving supply side constraints. 
Fiscal policy is a prime candidate. However, expansionary fiscal policy may not always be feasible or 
sufficient to bring about a recovery. For example, a country’s ability to employ expansionary fiscal 
policy as well as its effectiveness would be constrained in the presence of large existing debts. In such 
cases, further large deficits could even raise concerns about the country’s solvency, in which case the 
central bank might come under pressure to tighten monetary policy in order to avert a currency crisis 
and consequent financial market difficulties.
102 Any such policy would call for a delicate balancing act 
between short-run expansionary measures combined with a credible medium-term plan to ensure 
sustainability of the burden. 
A second candidate would be the restructuring of the banking, corporate and possibly household 
sectors, which are likely to be in distress. Distress can severely impair the intermediation process. By 
the same token, it can also blunt the effectiveness of other measures to boost aggregate demand.
103 
Any such restructuring would have to balance the need to redress balance sheets in the short run - 
calling for some form of direct or indirect recapitalisation - with that of putting in place the conditions for 
effective and profitable operation in the longer term. This would include, for instance, eliminating 
excess capacity and establishing incentives for the extension of credit at prices and terms that reflect 
the underlying creditworthiness of borrowers. As the experience of several countries that have faced 
widespread financial distress indicates, policies such as these are not easy to decide upon and 
implement. Quite apart from technical difficulties and the delicate economic trade-offs involved, the 
necessary political consensus may be lacking. 
Given that the zero bound could be a significant problem, how should monetary policymakers take it 
into account in their behaviour? First, they may wish to set a higher target inflation rate than would 
otherwise be the case, to provide a buffer relative to the zero bound. Indeed, countries with numerical 
inflation objectives generally select targets that are above the estimated bias in measures of inflation, 
                                                       
99  Drawing on the experience of the Great Depression, a number of studies have pointed to the effectiveness of exchange rate 
devaluations in a similar context, eg Choudhri and Kochin (1980), Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) and Campa (1990). 
Svensson (2000) has suggested complementing a strategy of exchange rate devaluation with a price level target. 
100  See Goodfriend (2000b). The tax could be extended to all government-backed financial assets (Fukao (2002)). 
101  On these points, see Mussa (2000b) and Freedman (2000), respectively. 
102  In some countries, fiscal policy may also be constrained by institutional mechanisms designed to ensure a degree of fiscal 
discipline. The Stability and Growth Pact in Europe has been cited in this context. It should be noted, however, that the 
Stability and Growth Pact does allow deficits above the 3% of GDP ceiling in exceptional circumstances. 
103  Moreover, from this perspective keeping interest rates at zero may even hinder the required restructuring, by reducing 
incentives to foreclose on insolvent borrowers. On the relationship between monetary policy and structural policies, see 
Shirakawa (2000) and Yamaguchi (1999b). BIS Papers No 19  39
 
thereby providing such a buffer.
104 Second, they could try to ensure that the inflation target is seen as 
symmetrical; in other words they could try as hard to keep inflation from falling below the target as they 
do to keep it from rising above it. Such a symmetric strategy could help prevent inflation expectations 
from rapidly falling below the target in the event of an undershooting of actual inflation. To the extent 
that this effort is successful, inflation expectations may become more symmetrically anchored at the 
target value, allowing the central bank to reduce real policy rates considerably even following large 
adverse shocks. Third, policymakers might consider adopting a price level target. However, a 
significant potential drawback of this strategy is that it could force countries to have negative inflation 
following inflationary shocks, which could be destabilising.
105 
Finally, if adverse shocks drive inflation and the policy rate to levels low enough to make the zero 
bound a more immediate issue, the central bank may wish to react more aggressively to any further 
negative shocks.
106 Given the possibility that the economy could reach and get stuck at the zero 
bound, the costs of downside surprises to the outlook in such cases are likely to be considerably larger 
than those of similarly sized upside surprises, suggesting that a non-linear response might be 
warranted. Moreover, in the new-environment view the unwinding of financial imbalances would be 
seen as likely to impair the operation of financial institutions and markets, perhaps generating 
headwinds that would reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating the economy. As a 
result, policymakers, taking account of these possibilities, might well choose to ease policy further than 
might otherwise have been expected in order to balance the risks to the outlook. 
Some might argue that it could be better to hold back on policy easing when rates reach low levels in 
order to “keep the powder dry”. This would allow the central bank to ease policy following any 
additional adverse shocks that might arise. Presumably the benefit such an approach might offer is 
that if a new shock were to emerge the announcement of a policy easing would provide support for 
consumer and business confidence at a critical juncture, thereby making it more effective and 
valuable. After all, the alternative of easing policy sooner would provide greater support for aggregate 
demand through the usual transmission mechanism. Even if it were thought likely that policy 
announcements could play such a useful role, however, holding in reserve an easing of policy that 
would otherwise be appropriate because of proximity to the zero bound could prove very costly if it 
allowed the economy to fall into a liquidity trap.
107 
V.  Refining the policy framework? 
What are the implications of the above analysis for the adequacy of current policy frameworks? Not 
surprisingly, they depend in large part on which perspective is taken when assessing the challenges 
faced by central banks in recent years. 
According to the continuity view, no adjustments are really necessary. To the extent that economic 
developments have resulted from a series of specific shocks to an otherwise stable environment, 
previous policy benchmarks and guidelines are still reliable. To be sure, central banks may have been 
confronted with rather large swings in asset prices by past standards. But there is no reason to believe 
that these are particularly likely to recur in future. Likewise, in those countries most severely affected, 
the recent series of negative shocks to economic activity could bring the prospect of reaching the zero 
lower bound for interest rates closer to the radar screen. But even then the risk might be perceived as 
                                                       
104  However, the inclusion of such a buffer probably reflects, at least in part, concerns about downward wage rigidities. For an 
analysis, see Akerlof et al (1996). 
105  Blinder (2000) notes that the price level target could be an upward-sloping trajectory for the price level. Such a target could 
obviate the need to engineer a deflation in most circumstances. 
106  This possibility is discussed by Blinder (2000), Freedman (2000) and Viñals (2000). 
107  An alternative justification for staying one’s hand might be for “fear of misfiring”. In this case, the central bank might be 
concerned about the possibility that reducing interest rates to a level close to the zero bound could actually undermine 
confidence. This could occur if the public became worried that the central bank was running out of ammunition or interpreted 
the action as a sign that the situation was worse than anticipated. This justification, while quite distinct, might be 
observationally difficult to distinguish from the one outlined in the text. 40  BIS Papers No 19
 
relatively small. After all, historical experience might suggest that, at least given the past history of 
economic shocks in the postwar period, the probability of reaching the bound is rather low. 
The picture looks rather different from the perspective of the new-environment view. According to this, 
large swings in asset prices and credit are likely to be less rare than in the past, given the conjunction 
of a liberalised financial environment and low and stable inflation and assuming monetary policy 
strategies that do not respond explicitly to the build-up of financial imbalances. This environment can 
make it less likely that unsustainable booms show up in overt inflation, allowing them to expand 
further, potentially even tilting the balance of risks from inflation towards deflation. As a result, other 
things equal, financial instability is a more serious concern. 
According to this view, it may be important for the monetary framework to allow for a pre-emptive 
tightening of policy to limit the build-up of financial imbalances even in the absence of obvious 
inflationary pressures. Could current frameworks accommodate this? In particular, would this require 
a redefinition of policy goals or just a change in the way present goals are pursued? 
It may be natural to think that such a policy would call for the addition of an explicit financial stability 
objective alongside more traditional macroeconomic ones. Financial imbalances are the harbinger of 
financial distress down the road. Therefore, a central bank with explicit responsibility for financial 
stability would have a clearer mandate to respond to their build-up even if monetary stability did not 
appear to be under threat. 
No doubt an explicit financial stability objective would tighten and make more obvious the link between 
the policy action and the goal. This is because it is easy to see an immediate relationship between 
financial excesses and financial strains. At the same time, such a redefinition of objectives is not 
necessary and might not even be desirable for at least three reasons. 
The first reason why such a redefinition is not necessary is that central banks have a long-standing 
legitimate interest in financial stability, which in fact predates their concerns with price stability. As a 
result, the basis for monetary policy actions to address financial stability concerns already exists. 
Historically the concern with financial instability loomed large in the early evolution of central banks, if 
not in their establishment. It was not until the interwar period, with the gradual emergence of fiat-
money standards, that price stability assumed an importance of its own. And with the Great Inflation of 
the postwar era, price stability became an overriding objective. More recently, with financial stability 
clawing its way back to the top of the policy agenda, central banks have inevitably been playing a 
leading role in efforts to promote it.
108 
Indeed, a consensus has emerged over some of the activities that central banks can undertake to 
support financial stability. Most basically, central banks should promote the establishment and 
operation of a safe and sound financial infrastructure. Important elements of this infrastructure include 
the framework of prudential regulation and supervision as well as payment and settlement systems. 
In addition, central banks can play a critical role in crisis management. A common instrument here is 
the provision of emergency liquidity assistance. Finally, from a macro perspective, price stability is 
seen as conducive to financial stability, as it lays the foundation for long-term sustainable growth and, 
in practice, is associated with lower volatility of inflation.
109 
The second reason why a redefinition of objectives may not be necessary is that traditional 
macroeconomic objectives can accommodate the required policy response. Arguably, financial 
                                                       
108  See Goodhart (1988) for a description of the early evolution of central banking and De Kock (1974) for an explanation of the 
shift from financial stability to price stability objectives in central bank statutes. Laidler (2001) explains the history of the 
thinking on the link between monetary and financial stability until World War II; Crockett (2000a), Borio and Crockett (2000) 
and Borio and Lowe (2002a) provide a stylised perspective on the nexus between monetary and financial stability to the 
present day. BIS (1997) describes the parallel evolution of central bank involvement in the pursuit of monetary and financial 
stability since Bretton Woods. See also Padoa-Schioppa (2002). 
109  Admittedly, how these general principles translate into practice can differ considerably across countries. One reason is 
differences in the allocation of specific responsibilities in the various areas impinging on financial stability, including 
prudential regulation and supervision, payment and settlement systems, market infrastructure and surveillance, and crisis 
management. Another reason is differences in policymakers’ beliefs about the effectiveness of the various policy options, 
which are, in turn, strongly influenced by historical experience. For example, there is no agreement on the merits of 
transparency in emergency liquidity arrangements. Nor, indeed, is there any on the trade-offs between financial and 
monetary stability responsibilities. As a result, differences in the way the responsibility for financial stability is allocated 
across institutions in the legal framework can appear bewilderingly large. BIS Papers No 19  41
 
instability can best be factored into decisions through its implications for traditional central bank 
objectives, such as inflation and output.
110 Correspondingly, at least from a macroeconomic 
perspective, financial instability could be best defined as the set of disruptive financial events that 
could generate macroeconomic costs in terms of those objectives.
111 For example, distress 
among financial institutions would not matter per se, but only if it was associated with output losses 
and the risk of deflation. In assessing the implications of financial strains, the risk of loss of 
effectiveness of monetary policy should obviously also be taken into account. As noted earlier, 
financial distress can generate “headwinds” and, especially if interest rates reach the zero lower 
bound, the efficacy of the monetary policy levers can be badly impaired, if not crippled. From a 
new-environment perspective, this definition of financial instability would be sufficient to accommodate 
a pre-emptive tightening, since financial imbalances would be seen as containing critical information 
about the balance of risks facing the economy in terms of inflation and output. 
Finally, a redefinition of objectives may not be desirable because it could risk placing the central bank 
under pressure to deviate too much from its macroeconomic goals in order to avoid the possibility of 
causing financial strains. In particular, central banks could come under unwarranted pressure to ease 
(or to delay a tightening) in order to address financial strains that would have only limited implications 
for the macroeconomy. This could in turn raise the risk of encouraging excessively imprudent 
behaviour - the so-called moral hazard problem. Indeed, as argued elsewhere, and partly for similar 
reasons, there may be merit in prudential authorities shifting further in the same direction too, away 
from the pursuit of narrowly interpreted depositor or investor protection objectives.
112 
While broadly consistent with current central bank mandates, operationally the shift in perspective 
implied by the new-environment view has somewhat different implications for specific monetary 
frameworks. The reconciliation is more immediate where the central bank is not pinned down to any 
numerical objective for inflation over an explicit short-term horizon. At least for communication 
purposes, in strict inflation targeting regimes with up to two-year horizons the justification of policy 
actions in response to imbalances may not be straightforward.
113 To be sure, it should be well 
understood by now that as long as inflation is on target the central bank has leeway to pursue other 
objectives, not least smoothing output fluctuations. But it may be hard to rationalise a tightening in the 
absence of obvious inflation pressures, especially if the outcome is likely to be inflation below target 
over the usual horizon. 
Arguably, at least two modifications would be called for in this case.
114 First, policy decisions should be 
articulated on the basis of a somewhat longer horizon.
115 While the precise timing of the unwinding of 
imbalances is rather unpredictable, the processes involved tend to be drawn-out ones. For example, 
the notion of ensuring price stability on a “sustainable” basis might be useful in capturing the prospect 
of future downward pressure on prices linked with the unwinding.
116 The second modification would be 
to place greater weight on the balance of risks in the outlook, as opposed to central scenarios or 
most likely outcomes.
117 This would highlight the role of monetary policy actions in providing insurance 
                                                       
110  While possibly giving rise to some complications in communicating with the public at large, it is clear that even for inflation 
targeting central banks output fluctuations are a consideration - so called “flexible inflation targeting”. These affect the 
gradualism with which targets are pursued (eg width of the band, length of the horizon, etc). On this, see eg Svensson 
(1999) and King (1996). 
111  This is broadly consistent with Ferguson (2002). 
112 See, in particular, Crockett (2000b) and Borio (2003), who contrast such a “macroprudential” perspective with a 
“microprudential” perspective of financial stability. Various aspects of this issue are also discussed in BIS (2001c) and Borio 
et al (2001). Crockett (2001) summarises concisely the implied shift in perspective on the part of both monetary and 
prudential authorities. 
113  For a useful discussion of communication issues in the context of an inflation targeting regime, see Friedman (2002). 
114  See also Borio and Lowe (2002a) or (2003) on this. 
115  Note that this rationale for lengthening the horizon is quite different from the one normally associated with the inflation 
targeting literature, namely, introducing gradualism into policy because of concerns with output fluctuations (eg Svensson 
(1999)). Rather, it reflects the view that the phenomena in question cannot be adequately captured over short horizons. 
116  This notion is put forward in Shiratsuka (2001). 
117  Decisions of this kind are formalised, for instance, in Svensson (1999). Less information-intensive decision rules, based on 
the notion of minimising the costs of worst case scenarios, have been discussed by, for instance, Courakis (1981), Hansen 
and Sargent (2001) and Onatski and Stock (2000), typically in the context of model uncertainty. 42  BIS Papers No 19
 
against costly outcomes. Central banks are already used to thinking in these terms. But the nature of 
the problem would put a premium on considerations of this kind.
118 
A related issue is whether policy frameworks in which monetary aggregates still play a prominent role 
can more naturally accommodate policies aimed at addressing the build-up of financial imbalances. 
The two-pillar policy of the ECB is a clear case in point. No doubt, such frameworks can make it easier 
to justify interest rate increases even in the absence of near-term inflationary pressures as long as the 
corresponding monetary aggregates are growing fast. After all, underpinning a more pre-emptive use 
of the monetary policy levers was an important analytical reason for the adoption of monetary targets 
in the first place.
119 Pillar I in the ECB strategy is rationalised precisely in terms of providing better 
signals about inflationary pressures beyond short horizons, complementing the assessment of more 
near-term inflation pressures based largely on real side indicators under Pillar II.
120 Even so, the long-
standing justification for responding to rapid monetary growth is that it foreshadows inflationary 
pressures. As emphasised here, however, financial imbalances also can herald recessionary, and so 
potentially deflationary, pressures down the road. This could raise delicate issues of communication 
and transparency unless a broader set of potential outcomes was explicitly considered. 
Conclusion 
Old or new challenges for central banks in the years ahead? In this paper we have argued that the 
answer depends to a considerable extent on the interpretation of economic developments over the last 
two decades and, more subtly perhaps, on how far back we are prepared to cast our gaze in search of 
comparisons. In order to highlight the importance of the interpretation, we have told two alternative 
stories, corresponding to two intentionally polarised perspectives.  
According to the so-called “continuity” view, the economic environment facing central banks has not 
fundamentally changed relative to that prevailing during much of the inflationary period. To be sure, 
largely thanks to central banks’ determined efforts, inflation has been brought under control, and is 
now lower and more stable than at any time since at least the 1960s. But the lessons drawn from the 
great inflation period about the functioning of the economy and the inflation process remain fully valid. 
As a result, there is little need to adjust the trusted policy benchmarks honed during this historical 
phase. 
By contrast, according to the “new-environment” view, the incremental changes that have occurred 
in the environment cannot so easily be accommodated within traditional paradigms. 
Financial  liberalisation, in conjunction with the greater anti-inflation credibility of the institutional 
framework, may have resulted in a subtle change in the dynamics of the economy. As a result of 
financial liberalisation, financial markets can more easily accommodate booms and busts. And with 
expectations better anchored around inflation objectives, it is possible that underlying excess demand 
pressures may take somewhat longer to show up in overt inflation, especially during investment-driven 
booms, possibly triggered by supply side improvements. Thus, if the monetary authorities wait for clear 
evidence of near-term inflation pressures before tightening policy, they may unwittingly accommodate 
the build-up of financial imbalances. Booms of this kind can result in an equally subtle change in the 
balance of risks, away from higher inflation and towards economic weakness, financial strains and, 
                                                       
118  We do not elaborate here on how this could actually be implemented. Various possibilities could be considered. One might 
be the use of reference ranges for the variables of key interest; methodologically, this would be similar to the analysis in 
Christiano and Rostagno (2001). Recently, King (2002) and Bean (2002) have discussed how a response to financial 
imbalances could be accommodated within an inflation targeting framework along lines similar to those outlined in the text 
here. 
119  To be sure, the information content of credit may dominate that of monetary aggregates. Conceptually, the link between 
credit and asset prices is arguably stronger than that between monetary aggregates and prices. Empirically, there is some 
evidence supporting this conclusion (Borio et al (1994)). For instance, it is not uncommon for financial imbalances to be 
sustained through borrowing in the international interbank market. This financing would not show up in monetary 
aggregates. Nevertheless, especially for broad definitions, there would tend to be a positive correlation between money and 
credit expansion. The Japanese experience during the build-up of the bubble is an obvious example. 
120  In particular, Issing (2002a,b) discusses how Pillar I could take into account financial imbalances of the type described here. 
More generally, Masuch et al in this volume consider the usefulness of money in monetary policymaking. BIS Papers No 19  43
 
given the starting low level of inflation, possibly even deflation, linked to a disruptive unwinding of the 
imbalances. In other words, this new environment may make it harder for monetary policy to be 
sufficiently pre-emptive. It may be necessary to go back to the gold standard period to find economic 
conditions that, in some significant respects, resemble those prevailing today. 
While the two perspectives look quite at odds, the operational differences in their policy implications 
can easily be overstated. We have argued that accommodating the new perspective would not require 
a change in the basic objectives of monetary policy but, rather, some modification in the way those 
objectives are pursued. It would call for somewhat longer policy horizons than the standard of one to 
two years commonly used at present and greater attention to the balance of risks in the outlook. 
Above all, it would call for greater weight being given to signs of the build-up of financial imbalances 
in deciding when and how far to tighten policy, as these imbalances would be seen as containing 
critical additional information about the sustainability of the economic expansion and hence the risks to 
the outlook. 
Translating these general considerations into operational and politically acceptable guidelines for 
policy would obviously require considerably more work. Some empirical research has been done with 
a view to identifying the contours of financial imbalances. While the results may suggest that the basis 
for judgments about the existence of financial imbalances is there, more work would be needed to 
provide a sounder basis for such judgments. Likewise, as it stands, the new-environment view offers a 
broad outline of the economic processes at play. But more analytical work would be needed into the 
relationship between financial imbalances, the business cycle and monetary policy to provide the 
confidence in our understanding necessary to underpin policy actions. Moreover, these efforts would 
be indispensable to allay the political economy pressures that, at present, would in all probability make 
it impossible to adopt the more pre-emptive policy consistent with the new-environment view. 
Arguably, it was an analogous change in the climate of intellectual opinion with regard to inflation in 
the 1970s that provided the basis for the subsequent successful fight against it. 
While not explicitly discussed in this paper, the new-environment view also has significant implications 
for the relationship between monetary and prudential policy. To the extent that financial imbalances 
are a more significant factor behind business fluctuations, the risk of financial crises with an origin in 
the nexus between overall financial developments and the macroeconomy increases. The difficulty in 
using monetary policy to address the imbalances puts a premium on prudential policy, perhaps calling 
for a shift in perspective among prudential authorities too. It is not uncommon for them to argue that if 
financial problems arise from a generalised financial cycle, then they have essentially a 
macroeconomic origin, and as such are best addressed through monetary policy. The 
new-environment view would naturally point to the need for greater cooperation between the two types 
of authority. Analytically, it would also highlight the desirability for greater cross-fertilisation between 
two intellectual traditions that have tended to develop separately over time. 
Two perspectives, two paradigms, two sets of policy prescriptions, but a shared goal. Which view 
approximates reality more closely could have implications for the future evolution of the world 
economy and the art of central banking. Exploring further their relative merits is a task that would 
seem to deserve further attention. 44  BIS Papers No 19
 
Annex: 
The natural rate of interest 
In the past several years, central banks have become increasingly interested in the natural rate of 
interest as an indicator for monetary policy. Three factors explain this revival of interest. One is a 
greater emphasis on targeting interest rates rather than money growth or the exchange rate. In an 
interest rate targeting regime, the natural rate can act as a policy benchmark that provides information 
with which to judge the stance of monetary policy, ie to judge whether the policy rate is relatively high 
or low. A second reason is increased uncertainty about more traditional guides for policy, such as the 
output gap and the NAIRU
  and monetary aggregates themselves. Finally, the success of the Taylor-
rule approach in monetary policy research has led to a more intensive theoretical and empirical focus 
on the link between the real interest rate and inflation. This  has cast new light on the pioneering 
research of Knut Wicksell. 
Conceptual issues 
Wicksell (1907) described the natural rate of interest as the value of the real rate consistent with price 
stability in the long run. The key relationship here is the gap between the natural rate of interest and 
market real interest rates. If a central bank tries to maintain market real interest rates above the 
natural rate of interest, then asset prices will fall and consumption slow. In addition, the relatively high 
market interest rate will reduce the attractiveness of new capital spending, thereby reducing 
investment. In addition, in a flexible exchange rate regime, it would put upward pressure on the 
exchange rate, which would depress net exports. In sum, according to the theory, a higher market 
interest rate leads to lower aggregate demand and thereby reduces pressure on prices. The effects 
would be reversed if a central bank were to maintain the market real interest rate below the natural 
rate of interest, thereby putting upward pressure on prices.
121 
Friedman (1968) drew a parallel between the concept of the natural rate of unemployment that he was 
developing at the time and that of the natural rate of interest. By analogy with the natural rate of 
unemployment, a version of the natural rate of interest - which might be labelled the steady state real 
interest rate - could be thought of as the steady state real rate of interest that would keep inflation 
stable over time. 
In recent years, Woodford (2002) has offered another interpretation of the Wicksellian natural rate 
within the context of a modern (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) monetary policy model. In the 
flexible price version of the model, the natural rate is defined as the real interest rate that would keep 
inflation constant from one period to the next. In contrast to the notions of Wicksell and Friedman, this 
neo-Wicksellian rate of interest would generally be strongly time-varying, reflecting various demand 
and supply shocks, including fiscal and commodity price shocks. These would cause inflationary 
pressure to rise or fall in the absence of an offsetting change in the real interest rate. 
Practical issues 
The natural rate of interest may be easy to define conceptually but is difficult to implement in practice 
because it is not directly observable. A major problem is that the Wicksellian natural rate is 
conceptually linked to the risk-free real interest rate. In most bond markets, this risk-free rate must be 
inferred by adjusting the nominal interest rate for estimates of expected inflation, time-varying risk 
premia and the effect of certain market restrictions, such as impediments to capital flows.
122 More 
                                                       
121  Wicksell (1907) succinctly summed up the implications of the natural rate of interest: “If, other things remaining the same, 
the leading banks of the world were to lower their rate of interest, say 1% below its ordinary level, and keep it so for some 
years, then the prices of all commodities would rise and rise and rise without any limit whatever; on the contrary, if the 
leading banks were to raise their rate of interest, say 1% above its normal level, and keep it there for some years, then all 
prices would fall and fall and fall without any limit except Zero.” 
122  In this volume, Upper and Worms argue that survey data on inflation expectations can be used to construct accurate 
estimates of ex ante real interest rates. BIS Papers No 19  45
 
fundamentally, the natural rate is that hypothetical real interest rate that is consistent with stable 
inflation - over the long run in the case of Wicksell’s version of the natural rate or over the short run in 
the case of Woodford’s version. As a result, estimates of the equilibrium real rate are generally based 
on a specific model of the economy, making the results dependent on the explicit and implicit 
assumptions embedded in it. 
While none of these problems is easy to resolve, the potential value of the natural rate framework for 
monetary policymaking can be assessed by looking at the correlation between a proxy for the real 
interest rate gap - ie the difference between the actual real rate and the equilibrium real rate - and 
subsequent changes in inflation. As Blinder (1998) suggests, a reasonable empirical proxy of the real 
rate gap can be estimated as the ex post real interest rate less its average value over a period 
sufficiently long to average out most of the effects from transitory economic shocks.
123 This approach 
is used in Graph A1. Two empirical estimates of the natural rate for each country are plotted - the 
mean of the ex post real rate (horizontal dotted line) and a time-varying measure of the trend level of 
the ex post real rate based on a Hodrick-Prescott filter (dashed line).
124 
The results of using these specific approximations point to at least two observations. First, it is clear 
that the gap between the actual ex post real interest rate and either of the proxies for the natural rate 
can be quite large and is variable. The time-varying estimate of the natural rate also appears to 
change by several percentage points over periods as short as five years. Second, consistent with the 
theory, there is prima facie evidence that a positive real rate gap indicates a relatively tight monetary 
policy that puts downward pressure on inflation, while a negative gap indicates a relatively easy 
monetary policy (Graph A2, using the time-varying estimates of the natural rate). Despite the small 
sample size and low t-statistics, the negative relationship across countries is evident.
125 This suggests 
that the real rate gap may contain useful information about inflation dynamics and the stance of 
monetary policy, as also confirmed by other recent empirical studies.
126 
Thus, the natural rate of interest might be a useful additional tool in the formulation of monetary policy, 
if only to cross-validate information contained in other policy indicators.
127 The natural rate could be 
used on its own or as an input into other policy guides, such as into a Taylor-like rule. 
Goodhart (2001b) considers the strategic use of a short-run version of Wicksell’s natural rate in policy 
deliberations, arguing that the natural rate, if informative and used appropriately, can help underpin a 
pre-emptive policy stance. He draws this conclusion, in part, from the actual practices of the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) at the Bank of England. The MPC asks its staff to prepare a forecast model-
based estimate of the constant interest rate consistent with achieving the inflation target over a horizon 
of two years. This constant interest rate path - equivalent to a short-term natural rate - then sets the 
 
                                                       
123  One complication is that the natural rate may vary over time owing to structural changes in the economy. For example, in 
recent years, policymakers have been concerned about the effect of faster economic growth on the natural rate. 
Theoretically, a faster trend growth rate (eg because of more rapid technological progress) would drive up the natural 
interest rate in a neoclassical growth model. The extent of the increase would depend on the willingness of consumers to 
forgo consumption in order to save and invest in the new technologies (Goodfriend and King (1997)). But other structural 
changes can also affect the natural rate. For instance, a structural shift in the natural rate can occur if consumers and firms 
change the rate at which they discount future outcomes, if there are structural changes in fiscal policy, or if there are 
changes in the economy’s degree of openness. As a consequence, empirical estimates of the natural rate as a long-run 
concept would need to be calculated over a period long enough to reduce the transitory effects of shocks but not so long 
that the effects of structural shifts are blurred. 
124  The tuning parameter in the Hodrick-Prescott filter was set at a very high level (λ = 30000) in order to smooth the trend 
series. No attempt was made to adjust the nominal interest rates for risk premia. Amato (2002) uses an alternative approach 
based on the Kalman filter to obtain estimates of the low frequency component of the short-term real interest rate, which can 
be interpreted as the long-run natural rate of interest. He finds evidence of significant variation in long-run real rates in 
Germany, United Kingdom and United States using data on both consumption growth and ex post real rates. 
125  The sample was restricted to exclude periods of extreme financial market stress, such as currency and financial crises. 
126  See Laubach and Williams (2001) for the United States, Archibald and Hunter (2001) for New Zealand, Calderón and 
Gallego (2002) for Chile, Neiss and Nelson (2001) for the United Kingdom and Christensen (2002) for Denmark. These 
studies also find that the information content and empirical reliability of estimates of the natural rate are likely to vary with 
the time horizon - ie the short run, the medium run or the long run - as well as across economic regions or countries. The 
relative usefulness of the natural rate at different horizons deserves further research. 
127  See also Issing (2002a) and Christiano and Rostagno (2001). 46  BIS Papers No 19
 
Graph A.1 
Natural rate of interest and real interest rate 
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1    United States: core PCE deflator; other countries: headline CPI.     
2    Prior to 1996, left-hand scale; in thousand 
per cent.   
3  Prior to 1990, left-hand scale. 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; national data. BIS Papers No 19  47
 
Graph A.2 
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United States (slope=-0.14; t-sts=-1.9; lag=12) Euro area (slope=-2.0; t-sts=-3.4; lag=12)
Japan (slope=-0.44; t-sts=-1.3; lag=12) United Kingdom (slope=-0.63; t-sts=-3.1; lag=8)
Canada (slope=-0.10; t-sts=-1.6; lag=6) Australia (slope=-0.60; t-sts=-4.7; lag=8)
Sweden (slope=-5.70; t-sts=-1.8; lag=10) Norway (slope=-0.80; t-sts=-3.7; lag=12)
Switzerland (slope=-0.80; t-sts=-3.3; lag=7) Brazil (slope=-0.01; t-sts=-7.2; lag=8)
Mexico (slope=-3.9; t-sts=-2.6; lag=12) Korea (slope=-0.50; t-sts=-1.9; lag=8)
 
Note: these panels show the four-quarter change in core inflation on the y-axis against a lag of the four-quarter average of the 
real interest rate gap on the x-axis; the lag length is indicated in the subtitle. For the United States, an adjustment for the 
“financial headwinds” in the early 1990s was accomplished by raising the real rate gap by 1 percentage point for 1992-93; the 
euro area is a weighted average of constituent countries, based on 1995 GDP and PPP exchange rates. Data limitations: euro 
area, 1997 Q4-2002 Q2; Sweden excludes 1991-92; Brazil excludes 1997-98; Mexico excludes 1994-96; Korea excludes 
1997-99. 
Sources: National data; BIS calculations. 48  BIS Papers No 19
 
stage for the MPC’s monetary policy deliberations. Goodhart observes that focusing the discussion on 
the reasons for deviations between this rate and the current policy rate naturally fosters a pre-emptive 
approach to monetary policy. Specifically, if the policy rate is inconsistent with the short-term natural 
rate, then the policy rate should presumably be changed unless there are compelling reasons for not 
doing so.
128 
Implications under the two views 
In the continuity view, the natural rate of interest can serve as an additional tool in a monetary 
policymaker’s toolbox, augmenting standard tools such as the output gap and the NAIRU.
129 In theory, 
all these concepts are largely substitutable as indicators of deviations from the economy’s steady 
state.
130 The relative attractiveness of any one tool depends on whether it can be accurately and 
reliably measured, for both research studies and policymaking. 
A preliminary statistical exercise on US data provides mixed evidence about the marginal predictive 
power of the natural rate of interest over the output gap as a predictor of future core inflation 
(Table A1).
131 The results depend in part on the “vintage” of data used. Those based on the latest 
vintage, which includes possible revisions after the fact, show that inflation forecasts based on the real 
rate gap statistically encompass the forecasts based on the output gap alone.
132 However, it appears 
that the relative superiority of the real rate gap (using the three-month Treasury bill rate) arises from 
the way the HP filter estimates the output gap during the recent expansion and the subsequent 
recession. The recession at the end of the sample period has the effect of pulling down the estimates 
of potential in the late 1990s, thereby causing the estimated output gap to be quite high during the 
expansion despite the fact that core CPI inflation was edging downward during the period. By contrast, 
the forecast encompassing tests using forecasts based on real-time estimates put the output gap in a 
more favourable light, as they largely abstract from the influence of the 2001 recession. Using the 
10-year bond yield instead of the three-month T-bill rate does not change the basic conclusion: there 
may be an empirical role for using the natural rate gap, but that role needs to be more fully 
investigated. 
In theory, however, estimates of the natural rate may be a comparatively more useful monetary policy 
tool in an economy where forces associated with the new-environment view may be present. 
Specifically, given the possibility of unsustainable asset price and investment booms and busts some 
measures of the real rate gap may provide less ambiguous implications for the direction of monetary 
policy than more traditional indicators. In the case of a boom, whether sustainable or not, the natural 
rate framework would be likely to prompt the monetary authority to raise the policy rate because 
measures of the natural rate based either on market interest rates or on the marginal rate of 
                                                       
128  There are, of course, many interest rate paths consistent with bringing inflation on target over the relevant horizon. Thus, 
Goodhart also offers a possible refinement of the MPC’s current procedure, conjecturing that monetary policy deliberations 
could benefit from a comparison of a constant short-term natural rate with two other related paths. One such path would 
initially lie above the natural rate and then decline over the policy horizon, while the other would begin below and then rise. 
Policymakers could then more easily focus on the implications of alternative paths for output and other important policy 
variables such as asset prices. 
129  Indeed, a number of central banks use the natural rate in this way. 
130  To some extent, the real rate gap may be somewhat more valuable in a policy setting for several reasons. First, the 
monetary authority has more control over this gap than over the output gap or that between the unemployment rate and the 
NAIRU. Second, interest rate data are available in a more timely fashion than the unemployment rate or output statistics. 
Finally, as noted below, the natural rate of interest may be a more robust and informative estimator of economic conditions 
than the other real side measures because it can potentially be measured in (at least) three different markets. It can be 
inferred from consumers’ intertemporal rate of substitution, from firms’ marginal product of capital and from the real rates of 
return in the bond and equity markets. To be sure, it may be difficult to obtain reliable empirical estimates of the natural rate 
of interest from the marginal return on capital. But, as described below, the significance of forces associated with the 
new-environment view may warrant further research in this area, along the lines of Mulligan (2001) and McGrattan and 
Prescott (2001). 
131  The analysis is limited to the United States because of the availability of real-time output gap data, which is important for 
monetary policy analyses (eg Orphanides (2001), Nelson and Nikolov (2001) and Gruen et al (2002)). 
132  The output gap forecast of inflation is based on real GDP less potential output estimated by an HP filter with a sensitivity 
parameter of 1600. The real interest rate gap forecast of inflation is based on the ex post real interest rate less the natural 
rate of interest estimated with an HP filter. BIS Papers No 19  49
 
substitution would presumably increase. On the one hand, if the boom was sustainable because, say, 
TFP had in fact accelerated, then the monetary authority would have to raise market interest rates 
over time to restore non-inflationary growth.
133 On the other hand, if the boom was unsustainable 
because, in fact, TFP had not accelerated, then a higher policy rate might be desirable to contain the 
build-up of imbalances in the economy, for the reasons already discussed in the main text. Similarly, 
once the imbalances began to unwind, measures of the natural rate would be likely to decline, leading 
policymakers to cut rates. 
Moreover, the central bank could obtain potentially useful information about the sustainability of asset 
price and investment booms by comparing estimates of the prevailing return on physical capital with 
those of the natural rate. If the boom was not sustainable, then the increase in investment spending 
would be expected to drive down the risk-adjusted real return on physical capital (ie the marginal 
product of capital net of depreciation and taxes) relative to the natural rate of interest, which might be 
measured based on the long-run average of the marginal product of capital itself, on market interest 
rates or on estimates of the marginal rate of substitution.
134 This gap would be expected to widen so 
long as excessive investment continued. 
In addition, a new-environment central bank might be able to use the information concerning the gap 
between the return on physical capital and the natural rate to corroborate measures of financial 
imbalances, just as a continuity-view central bank might be inclined to use the behaviour of inflation to 
cross-check estimates of economic slack.
135 From a new-environment perspective, this second 
procedure could be misleading when an unsustainable boom took place in the context of low and 
stable inflation, or indeed disinflation. The reason is that it would tend to lead to upward adjustments in 
output potential, thereby masking the signs of excessive expansion. 
 
Table A1 
Forecast encompassing tests: 1990 Q1-2001 Q2 
Data vintage  Real rate gap 
(using the three-month T-bill rate)  Output gap 
  1 ˆ α   1 : 1 0 = α H   2 ˆ α   1 : 2 0 = α H  
Latest 1.2  0.74  –0.2  0.05 
Real-time 0.0  0.00  1.0  0.84 
  (using the 10-year T-bond yield)     
Latest 0.0  0.30  1.0  0.96 
Real-time 0.1  0.00  0.9  0.25 
The forecasting encompassing equation is  , ˆ ˆ 2 1 4 , t Ygap Rgap t t ε + π α + π α = π +  where the dependent variable is the four-quarter 
ahead core PCE inflation rate for the United States. The forecasts are those based on the real rate gap and the output gap, 
respectively. All variables were de-meaned. The equation was estimated by imposing the constraint that the forecasts are 
unbiased, ie the coefficients are constrained to sum to 1. P-values of the hypothesis tests are reported. 
                                                       
133  In the short run, however, the natural rate might not rise initially if high capital adjustment costs are present, as pointed out 
by Neiss and Nelson (2001). 
134  Mulligan (2001) finds that the implied risk-adjusted rate of return on capital may deviate significantly from the benchmark 
risk-free return on certain financial assets, such as Treasury interest rates, in an economy with state-dependent utility. The 
risk-adjusted rate of return on capital in this type of environment is the appropriate measure of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution and, hence, the appropriate basis for estimates of the natural rate. While the financial return on the market 
portfolio for all assets such as property, human capital and business capital would also be appropriate, the return on a 
subset of assets in general would not. 
135  Formally, this is done by imposing the cross-checking restrictions derived from theory so as to obtain more precise statistical 
estimates of the output gaps (eg Kuttner (1994), Gerlach and Smets (1999) and Gruen et al (2002)). 50  BIS Papers No 19
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